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Abstract
This research aims to take a deeper look into Islamophobia, which is discussed as 
indiscriminate negative attitudes or behaviors directed at Muslims and Islam in the 
United States, France, and Canada. This research takes the perspective of Islamophobia 
as an important contemporary social justice issue, and focuses on the factors that 
surround and facilitate Islamophobia in the United States, France, and Canada. While 
this research makes special note of the importance of political rhetoric and the media as 
driving forces behind the continuation of Islamophobia, it focuses on the ways in which 
the presence or absence of, and type of national policy regarding the separation of 
religion and government impacts both legal issues surrounding Islamophobia and the 
larger social atmosphere regarding Islamophobia. After discussing the differences and 
similarities of Islamophobia in each of the three case studies, this research provides 
evidence that Canadian multiculturalism is a policy that better facilitates the integration 
of Muslims than the policies of separation used by both the United States and France.  
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Introduction: Islamophobia 
All across the Western world, millions of mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, 
friends, and coworkers, practice Islam. Though Islam may, to them, be only one part of 
their life or identity, it may bring them face to face with disapproval, discrimination, 
and even violence from the general populations of the nation-states in which they live. 
Even in liberal democratic Western states where religious freedom is the standard, 
Muslims are targeted because of their beliefs. In the news, in political debates, as well 
as in academic research, there are vivacious discussions of Islam and of its place in the 
West. Though these discussions may vary in significant ways, they often include a 
discussion of Western resistance to the presence of Islam, and sometimes discuss 
Islamophobia. 
Islamophobia is a term that attempts to define a complex socio-political 
phenomenon.1 Though Islamophobia is yet to have a single, accepted, definition, many 
scholars have proposed working definitions. Eric Bleich defines Islamophobia as 
“indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims.2” The 
Runnymede Trust, a think tank that specializes in ethnic and racial diversity issues, 
published a report titled Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All in which they defined 
Islamophobia as “an unfounded hostility toward Islam” and suggest that the “practical 
consequences of such hostility are unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and
communities, and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social 
1 Carl W. Ernst. Islamophobia in America: The Anatomy of Intolerance. New York, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013.
2Erick Bleich. "Defining and Researching Islamophobia." Review of Middle East Studies 46, no. 2 (2012):
180-89.
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affairs”.3 Juliane Hammer defines Islamophobia as a literal fear of Islam, but suggests 
that it is not a natural fear but an ideological construct that has resulted from political 
and public discourse.4 Andrew Shyrock suggests that Islamophobia is not the fear or 
hate of Islam alone, but the political designation of a universalized national enemy.5 The
result of this designation, Shyrock suggests, is a pervasive negative attitude toward 
Muslims and Islam recognized by journalists, politicians, and intellectuals, among other
interested parties, including the general public.6 Many scholars include Edward Said’s 
work on Orientalism as an important part of the explanation for negative attitudes 
towards Islam, which according to Said has been designated a cultural “other” that 
exists in opposition to the West.7 Modern Islamophobia has been shaped by a 
worldview in which European Christianity and the Oriental Muslim worlds of history 
represent separate civilizations that exist in a persistent clash, an idea that Samuel 
Huntington made famous in his work Clash of Civilizations.8 This research will not seek
to define or challenge any existing definition of Islamophobia, but seeks to explain why 
Islamophobia is more prevalent in certain countries than others. 
The understanding of Islamophobia as a concept is important, and should be 
understood not only as negative feelings, fear, or hatred of Islam, but as a larger socio-
3 Andrew Shryock, Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend. Indiana Series 
in Middle East Studies. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2010.
4 Juliane Hammer, “Center Stage: Gendered Islamophobia and Muslim Women,” In Islamophobia in 
America: The Anatomy of Intolerance, ed. Carl W. Ernst (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 
107-144 
5 Andrew J. Shyrock, “Attack of the Islamophobes: Religious War (and Peace) in Arab/Muslim Detroit In
Islamophobia in America: The Anatomy of Intolerance, ed. Carl W. Ernst (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013) 145-174
6 Andrew Shryock, Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend. Indiana Series 
in Middle East Studies. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2010.
7 Kimberly A. Powell, “Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism Since 9/11,” 
Communication Studies. Vol. 62, No. 1, January–March 2011, pp. 90–112
8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996; Andrew Shryock. Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and 
Friend. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2010.
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political construct that has permeated into prevalence within current Western society. 
Though Islamophobia is sometimes understood as an attitude, it is far more impactful 
than simply the sum of personal opinions alone. This is because Islamophobia 
negatively impacts the sizeable, and highly diverse group of people that identify as 
Muslims in the West. Islamophobia, which is conceptually comparable to xenophobia, 
is further complicated by the fact that Islam is not a phenotypical or single origin trait, 
but a religion that is practiced by more than one billion people across that globe, who 
occupy a variation of races, cultural backgrounds, physical locations, economic statuses,
denominations of Islam, and levels of religiosity.9 Despite this vast diversity within 
Islam, it is often treated as a homogenous group, which functionally makes all of Islam 
responsible for the actions and behaviors of any individual or group that is identified 
with it.10 
The purpose of this research is to take a deeper look at the policies and 
jurisprudence surrounding the relationship between religion and government and the 
ways in which those policies may contribute to the prevalence and intensity of 
Islamophobia. This research will compare polices that focus on separating religion and 
government, separation of church and state in the United States and laïcité in France, 
with the multicultural policy of Canada, multiculturalism, to gain a better understanding
of the ways in which Islamophobia is affected by these different polices. The purpose of
this comparison is to gain some understanding on which policies facilitate the most 
functional foundation for successful cultural integration, and therefore which policies 
will be most useful in the future for an increasingly globalized world. This research will
9 Pew Research Center, “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society.” Last Modified April 30, 
2013. 
10 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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focus on the policies of separation of the United States and France because, while 
seeking the same goal of separating government from religion, they have taken 
approaches that differ in significant ways. While the separation of church and state in 
the United States focuses on protecting religion from government influence, laïcité 
focuses on protecting the public space from the influences of religion. This is an 
important difference that could affect the presence of Islamophobia within these two 
nation states. This research will then compare these two policies of separation to the 
policy of separation in Canada that includes multiculturalism, which is a constitutional 
act that aims to protect minority cultures in Canada. This research suggests that the 
inclusion of multiculturalism has significantly improved the experience for Muslims in 
Canada, helped Canada maintain less intense Islamophobia, and facilitated more 
successful integration for Muslims in Canada than the polices of separation in the 
United States and France.
Islamophobia is different in the United States, France, and Canada. The 
presentation of Islamophobia is much the same in all three nation states, which this 
research will observe through public opinion polls and hate crime statistics. By 
highlighting public opinion polls, this research seeks to present the opinions of the 
general populations, as well as the opinions of Muslim populations, on a variety of 
topics surrounding Islamophobia. By providing hate crime statistics, this research aims 
to highlight the prevalence and intensity of Islamophobia within the three nation states. 
However, hate crime statistics are limited. It is important to point out that hate crime 
statistics only include crimes that are reported, and that meet specific criteria to be 
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classified as hate crimes11. Therefore, though hate crime statistics give some indication 
of the realities of Islamophobia, it is reasonable to believed they do not include all anti-
Muslim or anti-Islam hate crimes that occur. 
Though the presentation of Islamophobia is much the same, the central issues 
vary in meaningful ways. In the United States, the most unique significant factor 
surrounding Islamophobia is its implementation as a political tool to gain support for 
wars in the Middle East. In the United States, religiously charged language was used to 
mobilize public opinion to support wars that were framed as wars of liberation.12 
Specifically, the idea that freedom is a human right granted by the Judeo-Christian God 
to all of humanity, and a Christian duty to provide to those oppressed by a dictatorial 
and vilified Islam.13 For example, much of the oppressive image of Islam is centered on 
women’s rights, where Muslim women are represented as oppressed, second-class 
citizens with unequal rights and unequal opportunities, who require the help of a 
Western savior.14 This image is commonly connected to the wearing of religious 
traditional clothing such as the Hijab, a headscarf that covers some or all of a woman’s 
hair and face, that some argue serves as a tool to deny Muslim women identity and 
agency over their own lives.15 Juliane Hammer points out the hypocrisy of the use of 
women’s rights as justification for American involvement in international conflicts, 
being that the same conservative political affiliates who promote the wars typically 
11 Nickie D. Phillips, "The Prosecution of Hate Crimes." Journal of Interpersonal Violence 24, no. 5 
(2009): 883-905.
12 Kevin Coe and David Domke, The God Strategy. (New York, New York. Oxford University Press, 
2010).
13 Kevin Phillips, American Theocracy (London, England: Viking Penguin, 2006).
14 Juliane Hammer, “Center Stage: Gendered Islamophobia and Muslim Women,” In Islamophobia in 
America: The Anatomy of Intolerance, ed. Carl W. Ernst (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 
107-144
15 Juliane Hammer, “Center Stage: Gendered Islamophobia and Muslim Women,” In Islamophobia in 
America: The Anatomy of Intolerance, ed. Carl W. Ernst (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 
107-144
5
support restrictive domestic policies on Women’s rights, and that Women’s rights issues
remain a prevalent contemporary problem in the United States.16 Though disputes 
regarding Muslim women’s rights are not singular to the United States, it is specifically 
American that they are exploited as a justification for military engagement. Moustafa 
Bayoumi points out the further hypocrisy of religious liberation as a just cause for 
military intervention, in that it is only applied to specific Muslim majority nation states 
with whom the United States has a conflict, and excludes Muslim majority nation states 
with which the U.S. enjoys close economic and political ties.17 
These discrepancies suggest that a specific image of Islam is used as a tool for 
political purposes, but that image is neither a fair representation nor distributed 
universally. This image of Islam is pervasive in the U.S. because of the legacy created 
by the jurisprudence surrounding the separation of church and state, and the failure of 
its implementation as a universal regulation that excludes the influence of all religions 
in political action. Instead, separation of church and state has become grounds for 
judicial argument that has evolved to favor Judeo-Christianity, and exclude minority 
religions from its original intent to protect them from a dominating majority religion. 
Because this separation cannot be accomplished in a way that brings justice to both 
majority and minority religions fairly, it is not a functional policy for a democratic 
nation state. 
France is troubled by a similar problem, caused by the failure of their policy of 
separation, läicité. While separation of church and state in the U.S. aims to protect the 
individual’s rights to religious practices from the influence of the State, läicité aims to 
16 Ibid.
17 Moustafa Bayoumi, "Racing Religion." CR: The New Centennial Review 6, no. 2 (2006): 267-93
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protect the public sphere from the influence of religion. This means that religion in 
France is treated as a private practice, the expression of which is excluded from public 
view by a strong socio-cultural norm. This leaves Islam, that is an inherently public 
practice that includes unique religious clothing, in staunch opposition to traditional 
French customs of religious discretion. Though läicité was not implemented with the 
intent to discriminate against Islam specifically, it has been used in way that has 
indirectly marginalized Muslims, such as the Burka ban and banning of the hijab in 
public schools18. 
This suggests that läicité impacts Islam differently than it impacts Judeo-
Christianity in France which, like the United States, is another Christian heritage nation-
state that relies on a policy of separation to regulate the relationship between religion 
and government of both majority and minority religions. In France this does not 
facilitate the implementation of religious principles as a justification for war as it does 
in the United States, but is used to influence public opinion concerning immigration 
issues that are often presented as concerns for domestic economics. The unemployment 
rate in France has been at an all-time high throughout the last decade, peaking at over 
10 percent in 2016. For immigrants, the unemployment rate is astronomically higher, at 
17 percent.19 Adida, Laitin, and Valfort conducted a research study comparing the 
results of job applications between Senegalese Muslim immigrants and Senegalese 
Christian immigrants. They found that Christian applicants were 2.5 times more likely 
to receive a call back for an interview.20 This is a clear indication that immigrants in 
18 Alec Hargeaves, John Kelsey, and Sumner Twiss, Politics and Religion in France and The United 
States. (Lanham, MD. Lexington Books, 2007).
19 OECD, “Foreign Born Unemployment,” last modified 2018, https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-
born-unemployment.htm#indicator-chart
20 Claire Adida, David Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, “Identifying Barriers to Muslim Integration in 
France”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 107(52), 
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France face more barriers to jobs than the general French population, and that Muslim 
immigrants face even greater challenges finding jobs in France. Hargeaves, Kelsey, and 
Twiss attribute the exclusion of Muslims on the job market to a failure of cultural 
integration, caused primarily by the outward expression of the Muslim faith in läicité 
France.21 Instead of protecting the practitioners of this minority religion, the läicité 
separation policy creates the framework for a society that rejects the public presence of 
Islam, even though it tolerates the comparably subtle presence of the majority Judeo-
Christian religion. Just like separation of church and state in the United States, läicité is 
incapable of separating religion from the public sphere in a way that is fair for all 
religions. 
Based on the evidence from the case study on the United States and France, the 
problem may not lay in one specific form of separation policy, but within the focus on 
separating religion and government. Though there are still some anxieties and problems 
surrounding the integration of Muslims in Canada, the success that Canada has had with
the social integration of Muslims under their policy of multiculturalism could indicate 
that multiculturalism is a more functional policy alternative to policies of separation. 
Though multiculturalism is a relatively new policy, its success has been significant. 
Though anti-Islamic hate crimes still occur in Canada, there are far fewer cases than in 
the United States or France, and those cases are less violent, indicating that Muslims are
more successfully social integrated in Canada.22 Poynting and Perry suggest that the 
prevalence of hate crimes is less severe in Canada specifically because of Canada’s 
2010.
21 Alec Hargeaves, John Kelsey, and Sumner Twiss, Politics and Religion in France and The United 
States. (Lanham, MD. Lexington Books, 2007).
22 OSCE ODHIR, “Hate Crime Reporting: Canada,” http://hatecrime.osce.org/canada
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multicultural policy.23 They argue that multiculturalism, a constitutional amendment 
that states that judicial decisions will be made in a way that is consistent with the 
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada, has created a culture of 
cooperation among the general population.24 Despite the fact that Canada is a Christian 
heritage nation-state, just like the U.S. and France, multicultural policy is specifically 
defined in the nation’s constitutional Charter. By including it, judicial argument and 
interpretation have had official means to better accommodate the practices of minority 
cultures, and religion has not been left as a vulnerable target for legal arguments. 
Instead, multiculturalism has generated an atmosphere of social acceptance, and created 
the groundwork for successful social integration for Muslims.
These are the factors that make each case study unique to Islamophobia in 
regard to regulations of government and religion, but there are some other important 
contributing factors to Islamophobia that should be discussed. Those factors are the 
rhetoric used by democratically elected political leaders, and the rhetoric then used by 
the media. In all three nation states, the mainstream media has represented Muslims as 
violent, and often barbaric, stereotypes, that are a threat to national security.25 These 
unfounded, racist, stereotypes feed fear and hatred of Muslims among the general 
population.26 Hate crimes against Muslims increased, and public opinion of Muslims 
23 Scott Poynting, and Barbara Perry, "Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimisation of 
Muslims in Canada and Australia Since 9/11," Current Issues in Criminal Justice 19, no. 2 (2007): 151-
71.
24 CanLII, “The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11,” last 
modified April 17, 1985, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-
1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html; Scott Poynting, and Barbara 
Perry, "Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimisation of Muslims in Canada and Australia 
Since 9/11," Current Issues in Criminal Justice 19, no. 2 (2007): 151-71.
25 Manaf Bashir, Christine Ogan, Rosemary Pennington, and Lars Willnat. “The rise of anti-Muslim 
prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States,” The international Communication 
Gazette. Vol 76, Issue 1, (2014): pp. 27 – 46, doi: 10.1177/1748048513504048
26 Claire Aida, David Laitin, Marie-Anne Valfort, Why Muslim integration fails in Christian Heritage 
Societies. (Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard University Press, 2016).
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decreased following the negative portrayal of Muslims in the media.27 Though this is 
common across all three cases, the extent to which it influences the general population 
is different. These stereotypes become so normalized in the Western mind by their 
repetition, they become truisms, especially in the United States and in France.28 
This representation of Islam mobilizes the entire religion as a tool of political 
influence. This mobilization was especially evident in the United States during the 
George W. Bush administration’s “war on terror” when stereotyped images of Muslims 
were used to gain support for military action against “radical Islam” and again during 
the Trump administration to gain support for racist political endeavors including a travel
ban on Muslim majority nation states.29 Muslim stereotypes were also used in the 
French media most recently surrounding the presidential election campaign of Marine 
Le Pen, whose platform included the immediate reduction of immigration, specifically 
from Muslim majority North Africa, for security purposes. In Canada, though Muslim 
stereotyping does occur in the mainstream media, because there is an official 
multicultural policy there is a smaller populist media culture than in the U.S. and 
France. There are fewer stereotyped publications in Canada, and the Canadian general 
population is less susceptible to the ones that do exist, because multiculturalism has 
established a stronger culture of cooperation and understanding.30
27 Manaf Bashir, Christine Ogan, Rosemary Pennington, and Lars Willnat. “The rise of anti-Muslim 
prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States,” The international Communication 
Gazette. Vol 76, Issue 1, (2014): pp. 27 – 46, doi: 10.1177/1748048513504048
28 Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, “From Muhammad to Obama” Caricatures, Cartoons, and 
Stereotypes of Muslims,” In Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, ed. John L. 
Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011) 191-209.
29 Juan Cole, “Islamophobia and American Foreign Policy Rhetoric: The Bush Years and After,” In 
Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, ed. John L. Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin. 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011) 191-209.
30 Scott Poynting, and Barbara Perry, "Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimisation of 
Muslims in Canada and Australia Since 9/11," Current Issues in Criminal Justice 19, no. 2 (2007): 151-
71.
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This research will compare the policies of separation, the separation of church 
and state and läicité, with multiculturalism, to gain a better understanding of how these 
policies create a social framework that affects the prevalence and intensity of 
Islamophobia within the general population of the nation states that implement them. 
This research also considers the influential power of the rhetoric surrounding Islam used
by democratically elected leaders in each state, the rhetoric surrounding Islam that is 
used in the mainstream media, and how that rhetoric influences the public’s 
understanding of Islam and Muslims. The prevalence and intensity of Islamophobia will
be measured by hate crime statistics and public opinion polls. However, it is important 
to point that that this research will not include a specific discussion of Muslim women’s
issues. This is excluded because the topic of Muslim women is more complex and 
deserves more in-depth study than the parameters of this work can allow. This research 
will focus on the general Muslim populations experiences within the United States, 
France, and Canada. 
This research, which highlights those experiences, is important because it will 
take a critical look at the religious polices and jurisprudence of the United States, 
France, and Canada, and discuss the ways in which they contribute to Islamophobia. By
establishing a better understanding of how Islamophobia has been allowed to grow and 
circulate, we can gain a better understanding of how Islamophobia can be diminished. 
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Chapter 1
A Case Study of Islamophobia in the United States 
Under the Separation of Church and State
Religion has a central role in American culture. This is evidenced by the 
prominence of religious establishments across the United States, the presence of 
religion in public institutions, and the prominence of religious discourse within public 
forums such as popular media and among the nation’s elected leaders. According to a 
Pew Research Center study conducted in 2017, 70.6 percent of Americans identify as 
some variation of Christian, 5.9 percent identify with a non-Christian faith, 22.8 percent
are unaffiliated with religion, and 15.8 percent do not have a particular religious belief 
system.31 With 70.6 percent of Americans identifying as some variation of Christian, it 
is reasonable to believe that Judeo-Christian beliefs are prominent in the U.S. However, 
religious affiliations are declining, revealing a substantial shift from Christian affiliation
to affiliations with other religions, and with no religion at all. In 2007, 78.4 percent of 
Americans identified as Christians, a number that dropped to 70.6 percent by 2014. 
During the same time period, Non-Christian faiths increased by 1.2 percent and 6.7 
percent more Americans considered themselves unaffiliated with any religion, rising 
from 16.1 percent to 22.8 percent.32
Even with this shift in numbers, the importance of religion in the lives of 
Americans is unique among wealthy nations. A 2015 Pew Research Center study found 
in its comparison of 44 nations that wealthier nations are usually less religious, but the 
31 “Religious Landscape Study,” Pew Research Center, last modified 2017, 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/. 
32 “Americans Changing religious landscape”, Pew Research Center, last modified 2015, 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/
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United States is a prominent exception. Fifty-four percent of Americans claimed that 
religion is very important in their lives, while only 24 percent of Canadians, 21 percent 
of Australians, and 21 percent of Germans agreed.33 The importance of religion in the 
lives of citizens impacts the beliefs and value systems of those citizens, and is reflected 
in their political decision-making, which is expected in a liberal Democracy. 
Individual rights, specifically religious freedom, is an inseparable and central 
part of liberal democracy.34 Liberal democracy is the political ideology that protects the 
autonomy of the individual citizen.35 The United States is widely known not only as a 
democracy, but as a liberal democracy. This means it functions under a political system 
that is marked by a separation of powers, and the protection of free speech, assembly, 
religion, and property ownership. Fareed Zakaria points out that though democracy and 
liberalism are “theoretically different and historically distinct” their concurrent rise has 
linked them as a single, and defining, concept of the American political structure.36 For 
the majority of Americans, freedom is more important than the guarantee of access to 
their basic needs.37 Fifty-eight percent of Americans value the right to pursue their goals
without state influence more than a guarantee that basic needs will always be met.38 
Therefore individualism is central, and U.S. politics is heavily influenced by religion.39 
33 “How do Americans stand out from the rest of the world,” Pew Research Center, last modified 2015, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/03/12/how-do-americans-stand-out-from-the-rest-of-the-
world/
34 Aldir Guedes Soriano, “Liberal Democracy and the Right to Religious Freedom” 
Brigham Young University Law Review  2013, no. 3 (2013): 581-603.
35 Robert Audi and Nicolas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square. (London, England: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1997)
36 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” Foreign Affairs Vol. 76, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1997), 
pp. 22-43. 
37 Richard Wike, “5 Ways Americans and Europeans are different” Pew Reseach Center, last modified 
April 19, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/19/5-ways-americans-and-europeans-are-
different/
38Ibid.
39 Robert Audi and Nicolas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square. (London, England: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1997.
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The central role of religion within decision making, specifically within political 
decision making, is problematic because of the variety of religious beliefs that must 
coexist in the United States. This is further complicated by continued immigration. 
The U.S. is a society comprised of generation after generation of immigration.40 
Immigrants represent cultures, and religions, from all over the world. The variance in 
cultural groups within the U.S., that have continued to grow through immigration, have 
created a need for a different type of “American” identity. From this, the distinction of 
“nationality” emerged as a way to combine all cultures living in the U.S. under one 
collective identity.41 Though American national identity may have developed from a 
need to include all cultures, religious beliefs, and the core values they have, a social 
friction still exists in the U.S. and it is made evident by religious-based discrimination.42
Religious based discrimination is exacerbated when judicial decisions favor one religion
over another. This is where the presence of religion within political decision making in 
the multi-faith United States becomes problematic. 
The influence that Judeo-Christianity has had over laws in the U.S. brings the 
foundational concept of separation of church and state into question. The interpretation 
of separation of church and state has evolved since the founding of the U.S43. It was 
originally derived from the first amendment of the constitution, which mandated 
freedom of religion in the sense that it inhibits the Federal Government from declaring a
40 Kathleen Neils Conzen, David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli, 




42 Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. “What You Should Know about the EEOC and Religious
Discrimination,” https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/religious_discrimination.cfm
43 Julian R. Kassow, “Preaching to the High School Choir: Rachel Bauchman, The Establishment Clause, 
and the Search for the Elusive Bright Line”, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 79 (1996).
14
single official and potentially hegemonic religion.44 The idea that the first amendment 
goes further to officially separate the institutions of religion from the institutions of 
government is a product of the interpretation of Thomas Jefferson’s 1802 Letter to the 
Danbury Baptists.45 The First Amendment of the Constitution, the Jefferson Letter, and 
the subsequent interpretations of them have formed the official framework that now 
presides over the interaction between religion and government.46 Separation of church 
and state is often a topic in American courtrooms where religion often becomes the 
battleground for a multitude of issues.47 
The prevalence of cases that involve separation of church and state, and the 
often inconsistent outcomes of decisions, is evidence that separation of church and state 
remains a vague guide to issues of religion and government.48 Because it is vague it has 
become a source for argument and interpretation, which has left space for religious 
favoritism, specifically favoritism for the Christian majority.49 Justice O’connor in the 
case of Lynch v Donnelly stated that when a government shows favor to one religion 
over another, it “sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that 
they are insiders, favored members of the political community”.50 If separation of 
church and state fails to protect all religions equally, religious-based discrimination can 
easily grow in an environment where political powers show favoritism to majority 
44 U.S. Const. amend. I
45 “Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists,” The Library of Congress. 
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46 Julian R. Kassow, “Preaching to the High School Choir: Rachel Bauchman, The Establishment Clause, 






religions. The individual rights that are central to Liberal Democracy are therefore 
threatened by unbalanced Christian influence over political decision making, and 
undermine the success of integration in a society comprised of a multitude of religions 
from across the globe. 
The Separation of Church and State
During the founding of the United States, religious freedom was a primary 
concern. This is evident by the inclusion of religious freedom in the first amendment of 
the constitution. However, the first amendment did not secure a clear relationship 
between religion and government, but only prevented the U.S. government from 
declaring an official, national, religion that could potentially gain a hegemonic role.51 
The U.S. Constitution is a secular document.52 Within this document, the first 
amendment of the constitution states “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”.53 Article VI of the 
constitution goes on to state that “no religious test shall ever be required as a 
qualification to any office or public trust under the United States”.54 In 1802 Thomas 
Jefferson famously wrote a letter in response to the Danbury Baptists in which he 
quotes the First Amendment of the Constitution, and goes on to explain that the first 
amendment is “thus building a wall between Church and State”.55 Jefferson could not 
have anticipated the significance of this letter during his lifetime, as it was published in 
a Massachusetts newspaper in 1802, and not again until it was included in an edition of 
51 U.S. Const. amend. I.
52 James Hutson, “A Wall of Separation,” The Library of Congress 
https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danbury.html
53 U.S. Const. amend. I.
54 U. S. Const. amend. I VI, § art. VI
55 The Library of Congress. “Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists,” 
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Jefferson’s writings in 1853. It was not legally significant until 1878, when the Supreme
Court included the “wall of separation” phrase in the Reynolds v United States decision,
declaring that the phrase “may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the 
scope and effect of the [first] amendment."56
Following Reynolds v United States, there were five major court decisions 
concerning the separation of church and state between 1947 and 1963. These cases were
Everson v Board of Education of Ewing Township, McCollum v Board of Education, 
Zorach v Clauson, Engel v Vital, and Abington School District v Schempp.57 The 1971 
case Lemon v Kurtzman was also a major decision concerning separation of church and 
state.58 
In Everson v Board of Education of Ewing Township Everson filed a suit against
the schoolboard, claiming that the reimbursement of money for transportation to parents
of parochial schools was a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. 
The court ruled that the establishment clause “erected a wall between church and state”, 
quoting Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptists, and ruled that the reimbursement of 
transportation funds was not in volition of it because the school board provided the 
same reimbursements to everyone, regardless of their attendance in secular or religious 
schools.59 In McCollum v Board of Education, the Supreme Court outlawed religious 
education on public school grounds during regular school hours60. In Zorach v Clauson 
56 James Hutson, “A Wall of Separation,” The Library of Congress 
https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danbury.html
57 Kevin M. Schultz, “Religion and Politics in the Contemporary United States”
American Quarterly, Vol. 59, No. 3, (Sep., 2007), pp. 565-591
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the Supreme Court ruled to permit the absence of students from public schools for 
religious observance and religious education, against the claim that doing so would 
violate the establishment clause.61 In Engel v Vital, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
requirement of students to recite a state-created prayer is a violation of the 
establishment clause. Though the prayer was “nondenominational” the court ruled that 
requiring students to recite it would be considered “advancement of a specific religion” 
and therefore a violation of the establishment clause. The court stated that the 
establishment clause “at least means that in this country it is no part of the business of 
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite 
as a part of a religious program carried on by government”.62 In Abington School 
District v Schempp, the Supreme Court ruled that the recitation of Judeo-Christian 
prayers at the beginning of every school day is a violation of the establishment clause, 
because the reading of the prayer could create an atmosphere of social exclusion for 
other than Christian students. The court declared that the purpose of the establishment 
clause is to “create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious 
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or 
support for religion” and emphasized the importance of religious neutrality in 
government stating “while the government protects all it prefers none”.63 A few years 
later in 1971 the Supreme Court established the Lemon Test, that set exact parameters 
for separation of church and state. To pass the Lemon Test, a government practice must 
U.S. 203 (1948), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/333/203/case.html
61 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/343/306/case.html
62 Julian R. Kassow, “Preaching to the High School Choir: Rachel Bauchman, The Establishment Clause, 
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(1) reflect a clearly secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances or 
inhibits religion, and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.64 
Though the creation of the Lemon Test was a landmark for separation of church 
and state, its rules are still vague enough to leave much to argument and interpretation. 
The following years marked a decline in adherence to the Lemon Test and separation of
church and state during the court of Chief Justice Burger. In the 1984 case Lynch v 
Donnelly the Court ruled to allow a Christian nativity scene to be publicly displayed 
during Christmas time, ruling that the constitution allows for accommodation of all 
religions and does not necessitate a strict separation of church and state as long as the 
state does not show favoritism.65 This is a very different interpretation of the 
establishment clause. The following court of Chief Justice Rehnquist revealed a 
personal agenda to transfer legal favor of the first amendment from the Establishment 
Clause to the Free Exercise Clause. The court made its agenda evident in the decision of
Edwards which required that public school teachings of evolution must be accompanied
by teachings of creation science, but was never more clear than in the decision of 
Bowen v Kendrick. Bowen claimed that the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) to be 
unconstitutional because it allowed federal funding for both secular and sectarian 
organizations to offer council and research on subjects relating to adolescent premarital 
sexual relations and pregnancy. Chief Justice Rehnquist allegedly applied the Lemon 
Test, but declared that the AFLA did not violate the constitution because it did not have 
the primary effect of advancing one particular religion, though it did allow direct 
religious principles to guide the education of a federally funded organization.66 The 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid.
66 Julian R. Kassow, “Preaching to the High School Choir: Rachel Bauchman, The Establishment Clause, 
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court’s decision not only revealed Rehnquist’s agenda, but also the weakness of 
separation of church and state, even with the application of the Lemon Test. 
The transfer of favor to the Free Exercise clause made a very important change 
for separation of church and state. It allowed state entities to no longer adhere to strict 
separationist practices as long as it remains neutral among all religious affiliations, and 
allows only “non-coercive” religious displays.67 However, it is simply impossible for a 
government entity to remain meaningfully neutral while endorsing any specific 
religious practice, symbol, or expression, and impossible to endorse them all. By 
endorsing any religious affiliation, the government would simply be endorsing the 
majority religious affiliation.68 Showing favoritism toward the religious majority 
violates the one interpretation of separation of church and state that is clearest, that the 
government cannot endorse one religion over another. Furthermore, the interpretation of
a religious display as coercive or not is a difficult decision to make, and may vary 
depending on individual opinion. In the case of Bowen v Kendrick, religious 
organizations offering guidance to pregnant adolescents could be perceived as a 
coercive act, and if so, granting them federal funding would be a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. The transition to a neutrality interpretation of separation of 
church and state is a transition that allows the court to make decisions that preference 
the religious majority.69 Separation of church and state is neither successfully separatist 
or neutral. Instead, it struggles to draw lines between religion and government, and is 
unable to neutralize religious majority influence. The absence of neutrality creates an 
67 Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation to Judeo-Christian 
Tolerance,” 46 Willamette L. Rev. 691 (2010).
68 Ibid.
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opening for preference. The absence of genuine neutrality in the interpretation of 
separation of church and state has the potential to create an atmosphere of inequality, 
which could be detrimental to the integration of non-Judeo-Christian groups in the 
United States. 
Policy and Behavior
The Shortcomings of Separation of Church and State 
Forty-one percent of the general American population say that separation of 
church and state should be absolute.70 A 2017 Pew Research study has found that the 
majority of Americans have consistently agreed, with little fluctuation since 2008, that 
churches and other houses of worship should keep out of political matters and should 
not express their views on day to day social or political questions.71 However, the same 
study found that 62 percent of Americans agree that it is important for the President of 
the United States to have strong religious beliefs.72 These statistics indicate that the 
majority of the American people do not want religious leaders to openly endorse 
political viewpoints. Meanwhile, they require the leader of the U.S. to have a public 
religious affiliation. These poll results suggest a disconnection regarding the spirit of 
separation of church and state among the collective American population.
Rebecca Sager further investigates this apparent disconnect, suggesting that the 
current reality of separation of church and state functions based on a “culture of 
cooperation”, implying that there is no exact dividing line between religion and 
government.73 Audi, Robert, & Wolterstorff attempt to draw the line between religion 
70 “By 41% to 34%, Americans Think Separation of Church and State Should Be Absolute,” You Gov, 
last modified March 3, 2012. 
71 Gregory Smith, “Most Americans oppose churches choosing sides in elections,” Pew Research Center, 
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and State, and describe religious variation in “Liberal Democratic America” as a 
complicated subject. They suggest that the core ideas of America’s Liberal Democratic 
system are “equal protection under the law, equal freedom in the law, and neutrality of 
the state” when it comes to a person’s core ideas and religion. They explain that each 
citizen has the right to live as they sit fit. They place responsibility for political behavior
on the individual citizen, stating that a “good citizen will refrain from allowing religious
reasons to be determinative when deciding and/or debating political issues”.74 They then
point out that “the citizen” is a product of social learning influenced by one’s core 
beliefs, including their religious beliefs. If using religion as a compass for decision 
making is part of “living how one sees fit”, then barring religion from political decision-
making is a violation of citizen’s rights.75 Research has indicated that, aside from the 
argument put forth by Audi, et al., voters do not disregard their religious beliefs when 
making political decisions anyway.76 In fact, according to the research of Leigh 
Bradberry, voter’s religious self-identification, and frequency of attendance to religious 
services were both significant factors in their voting preferences. Bradberry begins by 
focusing research on the 2008 and 2012 United States Primary elections. Bradberry 
aimed to eliminate the partisan factor by researching voter preferences in the primary 
elections as opposed to the general elections, since during the primaries voters will be 
making decisions within their self-identified political parties. Bradberry found that 
voters who more regularly attend religious services were more likely to vote for a 
candidate who made explicit references to religion, and explicitly discussed political 
74 Robert Audi and Nicolas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square. London, England: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1997.
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issues that are connected to religious beliefs (such as same-sex marriage).77 These 
finding indicate that voters do not separate themselves from their personal religious 
beliefs when making political decisions. It is thus unlikely possible to genuinely 
separate religion and government in the decision making of voters, and furthermore 
unlikely possible to genuinely separate government from religious influence. 
Politicians have framed the public relations of both electoral campaigns, and 
subsequent political endeavors along religious lines. Though it is difficult to empirically
demonstrate motivation, it may be inferred that explicitly religious language is used by 
political leaders in the United States purposefully to gain votes and support for 
particular political actions. Explicit religious language and self-identification has been 
used multiple times in U.S. history by potential presidential candidates lobbying for 
votes, most recently including George W. Bush Sr. and Richard Nixon. The second 
President Bush, George W. Bush Jr.’s claim of being “a born again Christian” focused 
his campaign toward the 40 percent of the electorate with religious inclinations.78 
During the 1999 Republican Primary debate, when asked which political philosopher he
most identified with, George W. Bush answered, “Christ, because he changed my 
heart”. In 2000, newly elected President Bush received almost 80 percent of white 
evangelical votes.79 Coe and Domke explain that when religiously charged language is 
used, it sends signals that connect a political leader with a voter’s personal values and 
core beliefs. With this connection already made, people invest less time in researching 
politics because their key concerns have already been addressed by presumed religious 
77 Ibid. 
78 Kevin Phillips, American Theocracy (London, England: Viking Penguin, 2006). 
79 Kevin Coe and David Domke, The God Strategy. (New York, New York. Oxford University Press, 
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principles.80 By 2004, religion had become the key deciding factor on how Americans 
vote for Presidents.81 John Green, author of The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences 
American Elections, suggested that the 2004 Presidential election of George W. Bush 
was largely due to Bush’s ability to win votes from Protestants and Roman Catholics. 
However the 2008 election, he then speculated, would likely be less influenced by the 
vote of the religious populations.82 The following elections did show a decline in the 
importance of the strength of the candidates religious beliefs. In 2000, 70 percent of 
registered voters agreed that it is “important for a president to have strong religious 
beliefs”. That number remained the same in 2004, declined slightly to 69 percent in 
2007, rose slightly to 71 percent in 2008, and then declined from 67 percent in 2012 to 
62 percent in 2016.83 Though the percentage of voters who claim that it is important to 
them that a president have strong religious beliefs has declined, it is important to note 
that the majority of registered voters in the United States still do. 
The religious atmosphere that contributed to George W. Bush’s election still 
surrounded the nation during the 2002-2003 escalation to the War in Iraq. President 
Bush used religiously charged language while addressing the American people, asking 
them to support the war in Iraq, and also to justify the war itself. He stated that it is 
“America’s commitment to uphold liberty”. He spoke of “hills to climb” and “seeing 
the valley below” allusions to the Judeo-Christian Bible story of the Israelite’s escape 
from slavery.84 He spoke of overcoming the losses of war “through hope, steadfastness, 
80 Ibid.
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and faith”. He proclaimed the War in Iraq to be a “holy war” stating, “I believe that 
America is called to lead the cause of freedom in a new century” and justifying “holy 
war” by saying, “I believe freedom is not America’s gift to the world. It is the 
Almighty’s gift to every man and woman”.85 In 2002, the Bush administration 
circulated images of Saddam Hussein as the biblical tyrant Nebuchadnezzar and 
Baghdad as “a second Babylon”.86This religious language connected “a just cause for 
war” with the Christian populations of the U.S., and combined with post 9/11 fear, 
influenced large amounts of the American populace to support American involvement 
with conflict in the Middle East.87 Gershkoff and Kushner found in their analysis of the 
George W. Bush administration’s rhetoric, that the Bush administration juxtaposed 
Islam and freedom by consistently connecting 9/11 and Iraq. This was a deliberate 
action to gain public support for the War in Iraq88. After September 11th 2001, 
evangelicals showed an increase in votes for the Republican Party, and in 2004 the 
majority of Catholics supported the Republican party for the first time in U.S. history.89 
Coe and Domke point out that throughout American history, presidents have used 
religious language during military conflict, stating, “invocations of God and faith could 
have done much to mobilize U.S. public opinion, justify the conflict, and buoy the 
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 Bayoumi discusses how political conflicts contribute to what he calls “the 
racialization of religion” or the treatment of a religion, specifically Islam, as a 
homogenous group similar to a race instead of as a religion practiced by people of all 
different backgrounds.91 Bayoumi cites relevant nationalization hearings in the United 
States, beginning with the 1942 case of a Yemeni Muslim immigrant named Ahmed 
Hassan. He points out the court’s emphasis not only on skin color but also on religious 
affiliation in Hassan’s case, as well as other Muslim or phenotypically Arab’s cases. He 
points out that the religion of the applicants was specifically noted along with detailed 
descriptions of their skin color. Hassan was denied nationalization on the basis that he 
would be unable to naturalize in the dominantly Christian United States due to both his 
skin color and religion. The judge specifically stated, “Apart from the dark skin of the 
Arabs, it is well known that they are part of the Mohammedan world and that a wide 
gulf separates their culture from that of the predominantly Christian people of Europe. It
cannot be expected that as a class they would readily intermarry with our population 
and be assimilated into our civilization”.92 
This legalized exclusion regrettably continued in the post 9/11 United States as 
evidenced by The Bush Administration’s National Security Entry-Exit Registration 
System (NSEERS). The system, commonly referred to as “special registration” was 
designed to help fight the “war on terror” and mandated all nonimmigrant males over 
the age of 16 that are either citizens or nationals from certain countries to be 
interviewed, fingerprinted, photographed, and registered by the Department of Justice. 
The endeavor initially focused on men from Iran, Iraq, Lybia, Sudan, and Syria, but was
91 Moustafa Bayoumi. "Racing Religion." CR: The New Centennial Review 6, no. 2 (2006): 267-93.
92 Moustafa Bayoumi. "Racing Religion." CR: The New Centennial Review 6, no. 2 (2006): 267-93.
26
extended across 25 other countries in North and East Africa, West Asia, South Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and East Asia93. It did not include Cuba, one of the seven countries that 
are listed by the U.S. State Department as a state-sponsor of terrorism. It did include, 
however, Iraq and Afghanistan which were both invaded by the U.S., and a multitude of
U.S. allies. Bayoumi suggests that this proves something other than “enemy nationality”
was the deciding factor in which countries of origin were included in the registration 
act. He then points out that “little unites the disparate group of special registration 
countries but that they are all Muslim majority nations”.94 The fact that al-Qaeda 
activity had been discovered in France, the Philippines, Spain, Germany, and Britain, 
and that these countries were not included in special registration, “reinscribed, through a
legal mechanism, the cultural assumption that a terrorist is foreign-born, an alien to the 
United States, and a Muslim, and that all Muslim men who fit this profile are potential 
terrorists”.95 The exemption of the majority Christian Armenians from special 
registration, whose country of origin is within the Middle East, is further evidence of 
religion’s central role in defining the enemy in the war on terrorism. Deputy 
undersecretary for defense Lieutenant General William Boykin expressed a clearly 
religious rational behind the war on terror claiming that “my God is a real God and a 
Muslim’s God is an idol and the United States must attack radical Islamists in the name 
of Jesus”.96 Bayoumi states that when political policies connect terrorism with Islam and
with Muslim people, “political policy and cultural attitudes bleed into each other” and 
“when government actions impact Muslim populations so visibly, the public 
93 Ibid. 
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understands what is politically acceptable behavior”.97 This suggests that legal, and 
therefore legitimate, islamophobic polices suggest to the public that islamophobia is 
socially acceptable. 
Statistics on Anti-Islamic Sentiments and Behaviors in the United States
Islamophobia is a modern problem that is at a current peak. Though the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 sparked special registration and an increased 
islamophobic, and pro-war on terror political rhetoric that may have communicated the 
social acceptability of anti-Islamic opinions among the general population, 
Islamophobia is not a post 9/11 phenomenon.98 Though researchers are uncertain of the 
exact origins of Islamophobia in the U.S., they have found that Islamophobia first 
significantly emerging in the media during the 1960s Arab Israeli War, throughout the 
1970s oil embargo, and during the Iranian Revolution in 1979.99 These instances were 
significant in shaping the Islamophobic viewpoints of Muslims in the United States 
because the representation of Islam alongside these occurrences positioned Islam as a 
harbinger of violence and American vulnerability.100 Some researchers have found 
evidence of Islamophobia even earlier than the 1960s and argue that fear of Islam was 
used as a unifying concept in defining the early U.S. identity, and used as an “othering” 
technique to differentiate black Muslims from white slave owners as a justification for 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade.101
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Regardless of the exact origins of Islamophobia in the U.S., Muslims have been 
and are currently viewed by Americans as “culturally, politically, and theologically 
‘different’ or ‘unusual’ and exist in good measure outside of the mainstream of 
American life” and “because of this they have suffered political discrimination, verbal 
attack, and physical abuse in the United States”.102 This outsider discrimination may be 
explained by Taifel and Turner’ Social Identity Theory, which was developed in an 
effort to help explain inter-group hostility.103 According to Social Identity Theory, 
individuals’ self-concept is derived from membership to certain social groups. It is a 
three process theory that begins with social categorization, which is the act of mentally 
assigning people into social groups that are usually based on phenotypical identifiers, 
occupations, and religious beliefs. This large scale social grouping alleviates time 
constraints associated with gathering information relevant to decision making.104 This is 
a practice that is often used in politics to make time sensitive policy decisions.105 In the 
social identification stage, people self-identify to the groups in which they consider 
themselves members. In the social comparison stage, individuals compare their own 
social group to that of others thus creating “us” groups and “them” groups which can 
differentiate between groups that are included and those that are excluded. Research has
indicated that focusing on what makes groups different instead of similar can exacerbate
those differences, especially in times of political turmoil.106 Research has also indicated 
that “us” and “them” social grouping may create pressure to view members of opposing 
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groups as hostile, aggressive, and antithetical to one’s own group. There is evidence that
this process of social comparison has significant political consequences because 
political decisions may reflect in-group biases.107 
These in-group biases may also impact social behavior, specifically the 
prevalence and intensity of Islamophobia according to the results of public opinion polls
and hate crime statistics. According to a poll conducted in April 2011, 66 percent of 
Americans expressed an unfavorable opinion of Islam. A 2015 poll reveals little to no 
improvement in American public opinion, with 61 percent of participants still 
expressing unfavorable views of Islam.108 
Anti- Islamic hate crimes, including physical violence and intimidation spiked 
post 9/11. In 2001, there were a total of 546 incidents of anti-Islamic violence including
27 aggravated assaults, 66 simple assaults, and 296 instances of intimidation.109 In 2002 
these numbers decreased drastically, with a total of 155 incidents of anti-Islamic 
violence including 12 aggravated assaults, 22 simple assaults, and 66 instances of 
intimidation.110 Between 2002 and 2011, the number of anti-Islamic hate crimes 
fluctuated between the low 100s and mid 100s111. In 2012, there were 130 total anti-
Islamic hate crimes in the United States. In 2013, that number rose to 135 total anti-
Islamic hate crimes. In 2014, that number rose further to 154 total anti-Islamic hate 
crimes112. The number of anti-Islamic hate crimes then skyrocketed back up toward post
9/11 numbers in 2015, with 301 total incidents, 27 incidents of aggravated assault, 64 
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simple assaults and 120 incidents of intimidation.113 The number of physical assaults 
against Muslims in 2015 reached post 9/11 number after a 13-year decrease. 114 In 2016,
the number of anti-Islamic hate crimes continued to rise, with a total of 307 total 
incidents115. 
Being Muslim in the United States
According to a 2017 Pew Research study, 75 percent of Muslims stated they 
believe there is a lot of discrimination against Muslims in the U.S. Sixty-two percent 
stated they believe Americans do not think Islam is a part of American mainstream 
society. Fifty percent stated it has gotten more difficult to be Muslim in the U.S. in the 
last few years116.
According to the same Pew Research surveys, there is a distinct difference 
between Muslim men and women in regards to feelings of security in the United States. 
In general, more women have a higher level of concern than men. Seventy percent of 
Muslim women believe that it is likely that the government is monitoring their phone 
calls and emails, where only 48 percent of Muslim men agree. Eighty-three percent of 
Muslim women believe there is a lot of discrimination toward Muslims in the U.S. 
while only 68 percent of Muslim men agree. This gender gap is consistent with survey 
participants’ personal experiences with discrimination, being that 55 percent of Muslim 
women interviewed admitted to personally experiencing at least one instance of 
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discrimination within the past year of the interview, and a comparatively lower 42 
percent of men interviewed admitted personal experience with discrimination.117 
Though Islamophobia is not a post 9/11 phenomenon, islamophobic mentalities 
represented by the aforementioned poll responses and hate crime statistics, have peaked 
consistently with the media spreading of anti-Islamic political rhetoric. Most recently, 
this has occurred during the 2011 Iraq War, during the 2015 build up to the 2017 
Presidential election, and again immediately following the 2017 election of President 
Donald Trump. 
Bashir, et al. found that favorable opinions of Muslims in The United States 
dropped from 47 percent in 2001 to 37 percent in 2010. Their research suggests that 
negative media portrayal of Islam as “a threat to security” could be responsible.118 Their 
research also suggests that anti-Islamic attitudes are linked to the conservative 
Republican party, of which 63 percent believe “Muslim values are not compatible with 
American values”. They point out that religiosity is highly correlated with membership 
to the Republican party, and suggest that religion may be a factor in Islamophobic 
attitudes that they have found to be linked to the Republican party.119 More Protestants 
(including both mainline and evangelical Protestants) identified as members of the 
Republican Party than the Democratic Party. The majority of Non-Judeo-Christian 
based religious practitioners (including Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim) reported 
identification with the Democratic party. The religious population that makes up the 
Republican party is less diverse and more exclusively Judeo-Christian than the 
117 Ibid.
118 Manaf Bashir, Christine Ogan, Rosemary Pennington, and Lars Willnat. “The rise of anti-Muslim 
prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States,” The international Communication 
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Democratic party.120 Because the current interpretation of separation of church and state 
favors the free exercise clause over the establishment clause and allows government 
entities to endorse religious practices and symbols as long as all religions are given the 
opportunity to be recognized, it could be considered biased in favor of the religious 
majority, which is Christianity.121 If decision makers are inclined to make decisions 
based on in-group biases, including political decisions, those decisions will favor 
Christianity.122 When one religion is favored over another, the practitioners of the other 
are disadvantaged, especially when the Republican political party that holds majority 
decision making power in all three branches of government is evidently biased against 
Islam.123 Therefore, through the in-group biased decisions of the majority decision 
making political party, the modern interpretation of separation of church and state 
preferential treatment of the majority religion is creating a space for religious 
discrimination in the U.S. In that space, Islamophobia has flourished. 
Current Islamophobia and The Trump Administration
However, the biases within the interpretation of separation of church and state is
not the only factor that contributes to the perpetuation of Islamophobia in the U.S. 
Though the interpretation of separation of church and state has arguably created space 
for institutionalized religious bias, why has it affected Islam specifically? This question 
may be answered by, not only the history of Islam in the U.S., but by the rhetoric that 
surrounds it. When Islamophobic rhetoric is used by democratically elected leaders, and
120 “Party Affiliation”, Pew Research Center, last modified 2018.
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then spread through the media to the general population, it validates anti-Islam speech 
and action124. The use and reference to the stereotypical representation of Islam 
exacerbates already existing in-group vs. out-group biases and stimulates Islamophobia 
on a national scale125. 
The 2018 current President of the United States Donald Trump gained support 
during his election and during the first year of his presidency while making openly 
islamophobic statements to the public, and signing islamophobic executive orders. The 
Washington Post published a timeline of President Trump’s Islamophobic statements 
that includes 36 examples beginning in 2011 and extending through 2017. On 
December 7, 2015: Trump's campaign issued a statement saying: “Donald J. Trump is 
calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until 
our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on”.126 Following the issue of 
the statement, Trump tweeted “Just put out a very important policy statement on the 
extraordinary influx of hatred & danger coming into our country. We must be 
vigilant!”.127 Trump later read this statement aloud at a rally in South Carolina.128 The 
next day on CNN, Trump quoted a widely debunked poll that was spread by an anti-
Islam activist organization which claimed that a quarter of all Muslims living in the 
United States agreed that violent action against Americans is justified as part of a global
jihad. “We have people out there that want to do great destruction to our country, 
124 Moustafa Bayoumi. "Racing Religion." CR: The New Centennial Review 6, no. 2 (2006): 267-93
125 James M Penning, "Americans' Views of Muslims and Mormons: A Social Identity Theory 
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whether it's 25 percent or 10 percent or 5 percent, it's too much,” Trump said. On March
22, 2016 Trump told Fox Business, “We're having problems with the Muslims, and 
we're having problems with Muslims coming into the country.” Trump called for 
surveillance of mosques in the United States, saying: “You have to deal with the 
mosques, whether we like it or not, I mean, you know, these attacks aren't coming out of
— they're not done by Swedish people”.129 
Throughout numerous other examples Trump spoke of the general Muslim 
population as terrorists. This was done so often, the terms “Muslim” and “terrorist” 
were used almost synonymously. On June 13, 2016, following the mass shooting at an 
LGBTQ+ nightclub in Orlando, Florida, Trump declared during a speech in New 
Hampshire that “radical Islam is anti-woman, anti-gay and anti-American.” During the 
speech, he criticized Hillary Clinton for not using the specific term “radical Islam” and 
for making positive statements about Islam. He suggested that the immigration of 
refugees into the United States would mean opening the door to Islamic people, and 
therefore terrorists; “Hillary Clinton's catastrophic immigration plan will bring vastly 
more radical Islamic immigration into this country, threatening not only our society but 
our entire way of life. When it comes to radical Islamic terrorism, ignorance is not bliss.
It's deadly — totally deadly”.130 He stated multiple times that mosques should be closed 
down for security purposes, and suggested that “Islam hates us [the United States]”, and
that the United States is “not loved” by Muslims who are “sick people, with a 
sickness”.131
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In 2017, within a week of becoming President, Trump attempted to follow 
through on his campaign promise for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States” by signing an executive order that banned all Syrian 
refugees, and banned the citizens of seven Muslim majority countries from entering the 
United States. Presidential advisor, and the mayor of New York during the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Rudolph Giuliani told Fox news that President Trump called 
the executive order the “Muslim Ban” when he first announced it and asked Giuliani 
“how to do it legally”.132 
Hate crimes against perceived Muslims reached post 9/11 numbers alongside 
Trump’s statements in 2015.133 According to a study conducted by researchers at 
California State University San Bernardino, hate crimes against Muslims were up 78 
percent in 2015, following Donald Trump’s islamophobic campaign rhetoric.134 Brian 
Levin, the director for the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism in San 
Bernardino commented on Trump’s call for immigration bans and for a national Muslim
registry stating, “we’re seeing these stereotypes and derogative statements become part 
of the political discourse” and “the bottom line is we’re talking about a significant 
increase in these types of hate crimes”. He stated that the rise in hate crimes against 
perceived Muslims occurred immediately after some of Trump’s islamophobic 
statements. During some of the incidents, perpetrators even quoted Donald Trump. The 
Washington police released a video of a woman who poured an unspecified liquid on a 
Muslim woman while criticizing Islam and stating she would vote for Donald Trump 
132 Abigail Hauslohner and Jenna Johnson, “‘I think Islam hates us’: A timeline of Trump’s comments 
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because he would “send you all back to where you came from”.135 Mark Potok, a Senior
Fellow at the Southern Poverty Law Center stated, “I don’t have the slightest doubt that 
Trump’s campaign rhetoric has played a big part in the rising attacks”.136 The Southern 
Poverty Law Center also reported an enormous 197 percent increase in anti-Islamic hate
groups, which rose from 34 in 2015 to 101 in 2016 following the election of Donald 
Trump.137 The Southern Poverty Law Center attributes this rise in hate groups in part to 
the “incendiary rhetoric” of Donald Trump, stating that some anti-Islamic hate groups 
may have been emboldened by Trump’s language. One known anti-Islamic hate group 
called “the Crusaders” were reportedly thwarted from detonating a bomb at a Kansas 
apartment complex housing 120 Somalian Muslim immigrants. The attack was 
reportedly scheduled for November 9th, 2015 the day after election day.138 
Trump’s anti-Islamic rhetoric and executive orders to block travel from seven 
Muslim majority countries have understandably created fear in the American Muslim 
community. Sixty-eight percent of Muslims stated Donald Trump made them feel 
worried. Only 12 percent of Muslims stated in 2017 that they believe Donald Trump is 
friendly toward their community, whereas 64 percent stated that they believed Obama 
was friendly toward their community in 2011. Despite the highly publicized 
controversial relationship between President Donald Trump and the American Muslim 
community, these statistics are not at an all-time high. Instead, they reflect similar 
statistics of Muslim public opinion of George W. Bush’s presidency. Only 15 percent of
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Muslims approved of the way in which President George W. Bush handled his job in 
2007 and only 19 percent of Muslims approve of the way Trump is handling the 
presidency, whereas 76 percent of Muslims approved of the way in which Obama 
handled his job in 2011.139
The difference may be a reflection of the rhetoric used by the Presidents. While 
former President George W. Bush used pro-Christian and islamophobic rhetoric while 
promoting the war in Iraq, and President Donald Trump has used islamophobic 
language throughout his election campaign and presidency, former President Barack 
Obama refused to use the term “Islamic terrorist”.140 Obama explained that the use of 
the term places responsibility for the actions of violent subgroups on the whole Muslim 
community. He stated, “there is no doubt, and I've said repeatedly, where we see 
terrorist organizations like al Qaeda or ISIL -- They have perverted and distorted and 
tried to claim the mantle of Islam for an excuse for basically barbarism and death. These
are people who've killed children, killed Muslims, take sex slaves, there's no religious 
rationale that would justify in any way any of the things that they do," he said, "But 
what I have been careful about when I describe these issues is to make sure that we do 
not lump these murderers into the billion Muslims that exist around the world, including
in this country, who are peaceful, who are responsible, who, in this country, are fellow 
troops and police officers and fire fighters and teachers and neighbors and friends".141 
He went on to caution against the “danger of a president or people aspiring to become 
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president” using the term stating it “starts dividing us up as Americans”.142 The power 
of islamophobic language, even when coming from an influential political leader, would
be nothing if not for its publication through mainstream and social media. 
The Media and The Spread of Ideas
Mass media is a cornerstone of American culture because of its prevalence. The 
mass media spreads information through various channels, including print, television, 
and over the internet. News is also spread through social media, on public displays, and 
through word of mouth. Through these channels, Americans have multiple means of 
accessibility to mainstream news. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that Americans 
generally obtain information regarding the world around them from the mass media. 
The collectives of knowledge formed by the influx of information spread by the media, 
form the general impressions the audience has of the world around them. These general 
impressions form individual’s perspectives of reality, which translate into world view. 
In other words, the information that a person surrounds themselves with becomes their 
reality, and that information is coming from the mass media. The mass media is a 
steward of knowledge, and may be the most powerful institution of influence in the 
world. Kimberly Powell simply suggests, that the media are the distributors of ideas 
themselves.143 
Because mass media is the steward of ideas, it is fundamental to discuss the 
public understanding of terrorism as a media contrived concept. Islam entered the 
American mainstream media by the way of international conflicts, the oil embargo, and 
142 Daniella Diaz, “Obama: Why I won’t say ‘Islamic Terrorism’,” CNN, last modified September 29, 
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in connection to terrorism. International conflicts created a link between Islam and 
violence, while the oil embargo linked Islam to American vulnerability and as a threat 
to The United States as a whole. The link between Islam and terrorism surrounds 
incidents of extremist violence, and sensibly should remain a link between terrorist 
violence and extremist groups. However, the media has perpetuated a link between 
terrorism and the whole of Islam. The connections made between these occurrences and
Islam created the foundation for the public’s opinion of Islam. The populace began to 
view Islam as violent and threatening.144 
Powell suggests that after 9/11 the American media revealed a particular pattern 
in the depiction of Muslims, Arabs, and Islam. The media represented them as a 
demographic that is not only violent, but working together as an organized religious 
group unified against Christian America. Meanwhile, domestic extremist violence 
perpetuated by white people or Christians is depicted as a singular, rare, minor threat 
that is commonly linked to an isolated mental health issue and not to a larger cause or 
organization.145 The media’s emphasis on these separate representations of terrorism, 
including the use of the term terrorism itself, is significant in multiple ways. First, 
Powell suggest that the media has a toxic relationship with violence, especially violence
that can be framed as an act of terrorism. Powell quotes Abraham Miller, who described
the relationship between the media and terrorism as symbiotic, explaining that the 
media needs sensational events to remain relevant, while at the same time terrorist 
groups need the media to reach their greatest impacts. Terrorist organizations and 
vigilantes both need the attention of the media for public exposure before they can 
144 Salim Yaaqub, “Imperfect Strangers,” (New York, New York: Cornell University Press, 2016)
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become relevant. By using sensational words like “terrorist” and “terrorism” to label 
violent events, the media draws longer lasting attention from the public. Without the 
label of “terrorist” the audience may read about an incident, consider it an isolated 
problem and a singular action, and then forget about it. With the label of “terrorist” the 
audience will remain attentive, expecting a continued story or future attacks that could 
result from a group-related act of purposeful violence.146
Powell suggest that the media strategically frames events as “terrorism” when 
publishing information on violent acts committed by phenotypical Arabs, or anyone 
who can be connected with Islam. Powell analyzes the media coverage of terrorist 
events that occurred in the U.S. between 2001 and 2009. In her analysis she found that 
media agents actively sought to identify perpetrators as Muslims, and when they could 
do so, framed the coverage of incidents to depict the perpetrators as violent, radical, and
religiously-motivated, with a larger goal of harming the U.S. as a whole. However, 
when the perpetrators could not be identified as Muslims, Arabs, or connected to al-
Qaeda, the media focused its framing of the incident on mental health issues, personal 
histories of gentleness and kindness, family connection, and framed the occurrences as 
isolated events that were not linked to a greater cause.147
Because media sources are widely viewed as the distributers of ideas, the media 
has the influential power to guide the beliefs of a nation.148 As a result of this influential 
power, and the link between Islam and terrorism the media has published, islamophobic
sentiments have been and continue to cultivate within the populace. Research has found 
an association between increased news exposure and anti-Muslim prejudice. The study 
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found that higher levels of exposure to news of Islamic extremism is associated with 
increased anger and reduced warmth toward Muslims.149 
Another study has found that the rise in popularity of social media may be 
linked to the prevalence of islamophobia. Nearly universal access to social media has 
created a space where xenophobic and racist attitudes and opinions can easily be spread 
throughout the public. The prevalence of these attitudes and opinions not only 
normalizes islamophobia, but pushes the boundaries on the kind of speech that is 
accepted by the public. The perpetrators of these attitudes and opinions are also easily 
linked to like-minded people, and have been able to form large networks of anti-Islam 
xenophobes. This network is often called the “counter-jihad”.150 Deepa Kumar has 
called their practice of labeling Islam and Muslims as a threat to the security and values 
of the U.S. as the “manufacturing of the green scare”.151 The U.S. think tank Center for 
American Progress published one of the first attempts to identify the actors that are 
responsible for the islamophobic discourses circulating the media. They found that four 
types of political actors are responsible, the religious right, some Republican politicians,
right-wing news media outlets, and grass-roots organizations.152 The spread of 
islamophobic attitudes from these groups has had a heavy impact on public opinion, 
especially during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, according to a report published in 
2016.153 According to Gentzkow the growth of online news prompted the fear that 
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“excess diversity of viewpoints would make it easier for like-minded citizens to create 
‘echo-chambers’ or ‘filter-bubbles’ where they would be insulated from contrary 
perspectives”.154 These “echo-chambers” may have facilitated the spread of unverified 
information, otherwise coined as “fake news” stories. Gentzgow found disturbing 
evidence that the majority of Americans obtain the majority of their information from 
unverified news sources circulated on social media by biased “echo-chamber” groups. 
According to Gentzgow’s research 1) sixty-two percent of Americans get their news 
from social media 2) popular fake news stories were shared more on Facebook than 
popular mainstream news stories 3) many people who see fake news stories report that 
they believe them 4) the most discussed fake news stories tended to favor Donald 
Trump over Hillary Clinton.155 This information is meaningful for understanding how 
biases and false information is spread quickly and effectively throughout large 
populations of people, specifically anti-Islamic opinions.  
 However influential both the mainstream media and social media may be, it is 
important to understand that these outlets act as the stewards of ideas, but are not the 
creators of those ideas. Both journalists and private individuals spread information 
based on information they learn, regardless of the legitimacy of the sources. Powell 
suggests that the mainstream media bases its frameworks for the depiction of Islam 
upon influential people and organizations within the U.S. government; “The media 
relies upon the framework of interpretation offered by public officials, security experts 
and military commentators, with news functioning ultimately to reinforce support for 
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political leaders and the security policies they implement’’.156 Gentzkow finds that 
information spread through social media is widely accepted as truth.157 Because news 
consumers base their opinions, and ultimately their world view, on the information they 
obtain, Obama’s warning against trumps rhetoric is a legitimate concern. 
Democratically elected leaders have a powerful influence over the public, especially 
when biased information is spread to their advantage on social media. Their influence is
powerful not only because of their position’s legitimacy, but also because of their high 
media exposure. Therefore, when a person with legitimate authority and high media 
exposure makes islamophobic statements, the impact on public opinion is powerful. 
The Integration of Islam
This environment of stereotypical media representation and negative rhetoric 
has made it difficult for Islam to successfully integrate into American society. To 
discuss this, it is important to establish a working definition of integration. Integration is
distinctly different from assimilation, where individuals are expected to abandon 
cultural practices and to behave more closely to the mainstream of a society. Successful 
integration is evidenced by a population’s ability to safely practice one’s own cultural 
practices while still enjoying social acceptance. The level of the social acceptance of the
unique expressions of a culture is indicative of the level of successful integration of that
culture. The integration of Islam and Muslims in the U.S. can be measured by the 
intensity and prevalence of islamophobia. As previously mentioned, Muslims in the 
United States have expressed feelings of displacement, experienced discrimination, and 
been the victims of hate crimes. Muslims that are phenotypically Arab have experienced
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a higher degree of discrimination. In one Pew Research study, 55 percent of Muslim 
women experienced discrimination while a comparatively lower 42 percent of Muslim 
men did. Instances of discrimination include people acting suspiciously toward them, 
being called offensive names, airport security and law enforcement singling them out, 
and physical assaults. More women than men experienced more discrimination over all, 
and more in each category of discrimination. In the same poll, 49 percent of Muslim 
women state there is something distinctly Muslim about their appearance while only 27 
percent of men said the same. This research indicates that a perceivably “Muslim” 
outward appearance increased the likeliness that a Muslim person will experience 
discrimination.158 
There is also evidence of economic discrimination among Muslim populations 
in the U.S. Though Muslims have similar education levels as the general population, 40 
percent of Muslims have a household income of $30,000 per year, while only 32 
percent of the general population falls in the same income level. 
Another indicator of integration problems is the general population’s support for
the Trump administrations “Muslim ban”. According to a January 2017 Gallup poll, 42 
percent approved of the ban on travel from seven majority Muslim countries.159 In a 
similar poll from Reuters, also conducted in January 2017, 43 percent agreed that 
“banning people from Muslim countries is necessary to prevent terrorism”.160 The 
instances of religious based violence against Muslims, evidence of economic 
discrimination, the election of Donald Trump, public support for the travel ban on 
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Muslim countries, and the general populations expressed opinion that Islam is not a part
of mainstream society in the United States are evidence that the American Muslim 
population has not been successfully integrated into general American society. 
Conclusion
In the 1990’s, the interpretation of separation of church and state shifted in favor
of the free exercise clause, instead of absolute separation. This means that instead of 
barring all religion from government institutions, religion will be allowed as long as all 
religions enjoy equal opportunity to be represented. This has created favoritism for the 
majority religion, Christianity, because it is represented by the majority of decision 
makers. This has left minority religions disadvantaged, and has created a gap in equal 
treatment for minority religions. Islam is specifically adversely effected by this, because
of the history of alleged Islam motivated violence, the political rhetoric surrounding 
Islam, and the representations of Islam that circulate in the media. Influential politicians
have situated Islam as an anti-American “other” and used stereotypical images to pose 
Islam as a threat to American security and American culture. Because of the unique 
importance of Christianity to American identity, this posing of Islam as a threat to 
American identity has been successful. This representation was used to gain support for 
specific political actions, including the Bush administration’s war in Iraq, and the 
Trump administration’s Muslim ban. The media, especially social media, has 
participated in the spread of islamophobic ideas and have facilitated the perpetuation of 
islamophobia in the U.S. The prevalence and intensity of Islamophobia in the United 
States is made evident by public opinion polls and hate crime statistics, which 
demonstrate problems with the integration of Muslims into general American society. 
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Though Islamophobia is not a direct result of separation of church and state, the 
ambiguity of the relationship between religion and government in the United States has 
left space for interpretation in which the majority religion is favored, leaving minority 
religions disadvantaged.  Therefore, separation of church and state as it is not a 
adequate to accommodate integration for other than Christian religious practitioners. 
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Chapter 2
A Case Study of Islamophobia in France 
Under Läicité
Much like The United States, French history has been heavily influenced by the 
blending of religion and government, the trauma of which still influences French 
political decision making today. Currently, France is considered Une Republique laïque
(a secular republic).161 Historically, Catholicism had a hegemonic role in French 
government where Catholic leaders enjoyed heavy influential power and shared the 
wealth of the aristocracy. The ideas of the Enlightenment, especially the idea that the 
believers themselves, and not only religious leaders, could interpret the teachings of the 
Christian Bible were important contributing factors in the French Revolution.162 The 
idea that people could have direct relationships with God, and not only relationships 
with God through high ranking religious leaders, undermined the political power of 
Catholicism in France. Empowered by these new ideologies, jaded by the abuses of the 
French bourgeoisie and the hegemonic role of the Catholic church, and motivated by 
starvation and inequality, the French public revolted against the French feudal system in
1789 in what became the French Revolution.163 By the end of the French Revolution, 
the public successfully overthrew the Crown in a gruesome, blood-drenched, civil war 
that included the execution of tens of thousands of people during a time period known 
as “the reign of terror”.164 
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Läicité (Secularism)
After centuries of religious based politics and religious warfare, France 
separated Church from State in 1905, establishing laïcité (secularism), a collection of 
policies that prevents any single religion from establishing a leadership role in France.165
Though at first glance laïcité and the American concept of separation of church and 
state seem the same, there are fundamental differences.166 Separation of church and state
gives the rights to the individual so that he or she enjoys “freedom of conscience” and 
freedom of religious expression. Laïcité provides “freedom of conscience” through 
political power by keeping public space secular. Because of France’s history of 
religious wars, and as a means to prevent future religious wars, the common good of 
France has been redefined as “the welfare of society as a whole” and no longer to mean 
“the welfare of God”.167 To facilitate laïcité, religion is understood as two separate 
concepts; religion, which refers to an individual’s personal relationship with God, and 
organized religion, or le culte, which involves religious ceremonies, buildings, and the 
teaching of religious principles.168 Simply, laïcité in France aims to protect the public 
from unwanted religious influence through a strict socio-cultural norm that excludes 
religious expression from the public sphere. 
Policy Vs. Behavior: Problems with Läicité and Multiculturalism
Conflicts of public religious expression did not noticeably arise until the late 
1980s, when the need to freely participate in religious practices collided with the use of 
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long term public services, specifically in the military, hospitals, schools, and prisons. 
Schools especially became a matter of public debate, in regard to religious apparel. The 
Conseil d’État officially ruled in 1989, in response to the Minister of Education’s 
inquiry on the legality of removing students who came to school in religious clothing, 
that apparel must not be “ostentatious or assertive in nature, and would not constitute as 
an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism, or propaganda”. This vague ruling left 
much to interpretation as made clear in the case of Muslim girls wearing hijabs, or veils,
at school. Some French citizens believed the veil was specifically counter-feminist and 
oppressive, and others simply disapproved of wearing religious signs in public.169 
However according to Bowen, Muslims reject the idea that the veil is a “religious sign” 
because the decision of wearing it is understood as a personal commitment to faith, not 
a declaration to others, and therefore not in violation of the anti-proselytism rules of 
laïcité.170 However, Bowen explains that laïcité is a concept that is nowhere defined 
exactly, but is understood to communicate that “the neutrality of public space permits 
the peaceful coexistence of different religions”.171 Therefore, in 2003, parliament 
amended the aforementioned ruling, permitting the wearing of religious symbols in 
schools only if the symbols “are discrete such as pendants or medallions that are worn 
not to be seen”. This made the wearing of veils by Muslim girls in school illegal. Many 
celebrated the decision as a victory for feminism, though it still deprived Muslim girls 
of the right to choose for themselves.172 However, the specifics of this ruling could be 
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170 J. R. Bowen, Why the French don't like headscarves: Islam, the State, and public space, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007).
171 Ibid. 
172 Alec Hargeaves, John Kelsey, and Sumner Twiss, Politics and Religion in France and The United 
States. (Lanham, MD. Lexington Books, 2007).
50
considered an example of anti-Islamic sentiments within French social policy. While 
common modern Christian apparel is discrete enough to appease this ruling, such as 
cross necklaces, the Muslim hijab that specifically prompted this change in legislature is
not173. Outside of school, a Catholic nun’s habit is no less visible than a Muslim’s veil, 
and should serve as an intense visual reminder of France’s bloody religious political 
history, but it is only the hijab that is portrayed in the media as a harbinger of 
violence.174 Furthermore, Plenel points out that French secularism was established not to
exclude religious minorities, but to protect them. By illegalizing Muslim specific 
clothing, such as the niqab in public and the hijab in schools, while allowing priest’s 
clothing and nun’s habits to be worn in public, and allowing small Christian crosses at 
school under the guise of secularism, France is using the principles of laïcité in direct 
opposition to itself.175 
A law established in 1978 restricts official recordkeeping of religious data in 
France. Therefore, there is no official census data regarding self-identified religion in 
France after that date. However, public polls have since been collected regarding 
religious self-identification, and though it is not considered official state data, polls are 
widely accepted as authoritative information.176 According to such polls, in 2006 only 
approximately 2.2 percent of French citizens identified as Protestants. In fact, only 10 
percent (roughly more than four times fewer than The United States) of French citizens 
considered themselves “practicing Christians” in 2006. The practice of Christianity in 
France declined steadily between 1905 to 2006, as is it was most commonly considered 
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“anti-modern” to practice Christianity.177 According to the latest works by the Pew 
Research Center Global Religious Futures Project, religious affiliation in general has 
continued to decline, and is projected to decline further. In 2010, Pew Research 
estimated that 39,560,000 people in France (63 percent) identified as Christian. In the 
same year, only 4,710,000 people in France (7.5 percent) identified as Muslim, and 
17,580,000 people (28 percent) identified as unaffiliated with a religion. Pew Research 
projects that by 2020, 37,940,000 people in France (58.1 percent) will identify as 
Christian and 5,430,000 people in France (8.3 percent) will identify as Muslim, while 
20,830,000 people (31.9 percent) will identify as unaffiliated with a religion. According
to this research Christianity is declining, along with affiliation with religion in general 
which is also declining, while Islam slowly increasing.178 
The explanation for the rise in Muslim practitioners in France during the decline
of other religious affiliation is not only immigration, but also procreation. The Muslim 
population in Europe is both younger and has more children than the non-Muslim 
European population. In 2016, 50 percent of Muslims in Europe were under the age of 
30, while only 32 percent of non-Muslim Europeans were under the age of 30. Also, 
Muslim women in Europe have an average birth rate of 2.6 children each, whereas non-
Muslim Europeans have an average of only 1.6 children each.179 Thought the Muslim 
population is growing, the overall trend is a decline in religious affiliation. Although 
Muslim women are having presumably Muslim children at a higher rate than French 
177Kevin Phillips, American Theocracy (London, England: Viking Penguin, 2006).
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women are having children, this is not significant evidence of eventual “Islamicization”.
Laurence and Vaisse discuss the fear that France will become “Islamicized” due to 
Muslim immigration and that native Europeans will soon be facing “dhimmitude”, the 
majority status of Islamic tradition, in their own country.180
Regardless of the overall trend of declining religious affiliation, Islam has 
become the second largest religion in France and has continued to grow.181 Because 
France has no official means of tracking the number of religious practitioners due to the
1978 law, local officials began investigating the size of Mosque congregations in 
October 2001, in a fearfully motivated response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.182 
Threatened by the rapid growth and fears of “Islamatization”, the French State began 
adjusting the 1905 law of laïcité to allow some government funding for locations of 
various forms of worship, including Muslim mosques, and to pay for the training of 
religious leaders, including Muslim imams. This was in response to Muslim religious 
organizations practice of reaching outside the borders of France for funding, believing it
to be safer and healthier to avoid foreign dependence.183 Furthermore, in the hopes of 
integrating Islam into the French republic by establishing an Islam of France, the French
government established the French Council of the Muslim Religion, and in doing so, 
established official representatives of the Muslim population on the basis of religion. 
The French government accepted the responsibility of providing Muslim citizens with 
respectable places to practice their faith in public institutions such as prisons and city 
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centers.184 This change was a long time coming, and did not come without conflict. 
Muslim immigrants and their decedents, known as the beurs, fought for decades to be 
treated fairly as French citizens, some of which turned to violent means.185 In just a few 
examples, radical Islamic groups cried support for Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf
War in 1991, and claimed responsibility for bombings in Paris in 1995. The September 
11, 2001 attacks only further damaged the image of Islam in France, as it only 
continued the discourse of a reputation already devastated by France’s own history. 
Bashir, et al. found in their study of Islamophobia in eight-countries, that anti-Muslim 
attitudes in France are higher today than they were in the 1980s. While anti-Islamic 
mentalities in other European countries declined between 2004 and 2008, France 
remained steadily around 62 percent.186
Despite the fact that laïcité attempts to regulate the importance of religious 
affiliation Islam continues to face social and political discrimination. In the instances of 
religious apparel in schools, and localizing funding for religious establishments, laïcité 
has been amended to facilitate a demographically changing France. Despite these 
changes, Islamophobia remains a prevalent problem in France. The prevalence and 
intensity of Islamophobia in France is measured by hate crime statistics and public 
opinion polls. 
Statistics on anti-Islamic Sentiments and Behaviors in France
According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
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Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) anti-Muslim hate 
crimes have fluctuated between 2012 and 2016. In 2012 there were a total of 287 
reported hate crimes against Muslims or Islam. This number includes 54 physical 
assaults, 149 cases of threats and 84 cases of damage to mosques or cemeteries. In 
2013, there were 301 reported hate crimes against Muslims or Islam. This number 
includes 62 physical assaults, 9 cases of desecration to a cemetery, 66 cases of damage 
to mosques, and 164 threats. In 2014, there were 133 reported hate crimes against 
Muslims or Islam. This number includes 55 physical assaults, and 78 threats. In 2015, 
there were 336 reported hate crimes against Muslims or Islam. This number includes 29
physical assaults, 18 arson attacks, 74 cases of damage to property, 174 incidents of 
vandalism and 40 cases of threat. In 2016, there were 53 reported hate crimes against 
Muslims or Islam. This number includes 26 attacks on property, 10 threats, and 17 
physical assaults.187 The number of incidents declined to 133 in 2014, but spiked back 
up drastically to 336 in 2015, following multiple terrorist attacks in France that were 
perpetrated by extremist groups. While the number of violent incidents peaked, there 
were also 419 reported incidents of discrimination in 2015.188
A 2016 Pew Global Research Study found 29 percent of French people have 
unfavorable views of Muslims.189 This represents an increase in unfavorable opinions 
from the previous years, where 28 percent of polled participants represent an 
unfavorable view of Muslims in 2014 and 24 percent in 2015.190 This number represents
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a significant thirteen-point age gap between ages 50 and older and ages 18-34, 
indicating that the younger demographic in France has more favorable views of 
Muslims. There is also a significant eleven-point educational gap, where more people 
with post-secondary educations have a favorable view of Muslims, and more people 
with a secondary education or less have an unfavorable view of Muslims.191 
The most significant divide in all European countries is between political 
parties. In France, 21 percent of the left reported unfavorable views of Muslims, and 26 
percent of the center reported unfavorable views of Muslims, whereas 39 percent of the 
right reported unfavorable views of Muslims. This represents an 18 percent difference 
between the left and the right in their views on Muslims. These differences emerge 
consistently into partisan divides, where supporters of the anti-immigrant National 
Front political party are 32 percentage points more negative toward Muslims than those 
who identify with the Socialist Party.192
The statistics indicate that Islamophobia is more prevalent among less educated 
people 50 years old and above, who support far right National Front party politics. 
Political issues may be an important driving force for Islamophobia in France. The most
important influential political factors that could be driving Islamophobia are issues of 
immigration and economics, which in France are closely related, exacerbated by laïcité,





Economics and Immigration 
The post-World War II  period in France,  from approximately 1960 until  the
mid-1970s,  was a  time of rapid economic  growth in  France.  On average,  the gross
domestic  product  (GDP)  increased  by nearly  6  percent  each  year.193 This  period  is
known as Les Trente Glorieuses (“thirty years of glory”), named by French economist
Jean Fourastié..194 
The  rapid  economic  boom  incentivized  mass  migration  into  France.  The
majority  of  immigrants  were  Algerian  and  Moroccan  Muslims  (called  Meghrebis)
seeking the economic opportunities promised by France. Immigrant workers benefited
greatly from the booming French economy during Les Trente Glorieuses but in the mid-
1970s, following the first oil shock of 1973, the economy began to decline. As a result
of the declining economy,  and in response to a later flawed cost-benefit  analysis  of
immigration (conducted by the French government) stating that immigrants cost more
money than they contribute, the French government suspended any further economic
immigration in 1974. This meant that people could no longer immigrate to France for
the purpose of obtaining employment. This decision also prevented the reunification of
countless Meghrebi families. Immigrants that relocated during the economic boom were
reluctant to return to their  countries of origin because they had established families,
homes, and children in France. Deindustrialization led to large scale immigrant lay-offs
and  therefore  massive  poverty  within  immigrant  communities.  Meghrebi  immigrant
families were forced into the abandoned slums of France. 
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Accessed March 6, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/place/France/Economy
194 Jean Fourastié, “Les trente glorieuses : ou, La Révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975”, Ed. Revue Et 
Mise à Jour.. ed. Livre De Poche. Collection Pluriel. Paris: Fayard, 1979.
57
Today, immigrants have the potential to significantly contribute to the French
economy, if given opportunities for employment.195 Hundreds of thousands of refugees
are  currently  migrating  across  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  but  most  seem  to  prefer
settlements in Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, because of the difficulty
that immigrants have finding jobs in France. Migration specialist François Gemene at
Science  Po’s  Center  for  International  Research  argues  that  France  should  be  more
concerned that they are no longer attractive to people seeking opportunity or sanctuary,
and should do more to welcome refugees. Economists  predict  refuges will  stimulate
economic boosts across the Eurozone, which is much needed for the French economy.196
Joblessness is a major concern for the Muslim immigrant population in France.
Fifty-two  percent  of  French  Muslims  state  they  are  worried  about  unemployment
among  Muslim  populations  specifically,  and  32  percent  agree  they  are  somewhat
concerned. Unemployment is a more serious concern for Muslim people in France than
the general French population, which is evidence of Islamophobia in France.197
Hargreaves, et. al provide further evidence of the prevalence of Islamophobia in
France. They discuss that the lack of economic opportunity has contributed to a rise in
violence  within  Meghrebis-French  communities,  and  attributes  this  phenomenon  to
failed  integration  and  marginalization.  The  research  of  Adida,  et.  al  reveals
discrimination against Muslims in the French labor market. Their research found that a
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Muslim  is  2.5  times  less  likely  to  be  chosen  for  a  job  compared  to  a  Christian
applicant.198 
It  is  challenging  to  separate  the  factor  of  religion  from other  various  socio-
cultural  factors  such  as  family  income,  education,  etc.  In  an  effort  to  separate  the
religion variable from other cultural factors, Claire Adida, et. al conducted a research
study comparing the experiences of Senegalese Muslims and Senegalese Christians who
immigrated to France around the same time period. After interviewing 511 immigrants,
the researched found four trends. First, Muslim immigrants experience discrimination in
the job market precisely because of their religion. When employers were presented with
matching CV applications,  differing only in religious preference,  Muslim candidates
were 2.5 times less likely to be granted an interview.199 Second, Senegalese Muslims
claim to be more attached to their region of origin than Senegalese Christians claimed.
They are more likely to visit Africa, own homes in Africa, and to send remittances back
to family or friends in Africa. Third, they are less attached to their host country than
their Christian counterparts. They express less sympathy for French people, and are less
likely  to  believe  they  share  much  in  common  with  French  people.  This  is  in  part
because  Senegalese  Muslims  are  less  secular  than  Senegalese  Christians,  a  vital
integration factor in a France that defines itself by läcité. Lastly, the researchers found
that the separations between the attitudes and norms of Senegalese Muslim immigrants
and  French  nationals  perpetuate  throughout  time  and  persist  to  second,  and  third
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generation Senegalese Muslim immigrants.200 This very evident discrimination against
Muslims in the job market is central evidence that Islamophobia is a prevalent problem
in  France,  and that  Muslim immigrants  struggle  to  successfully  integrate  in  France
specifically because of their religion. 
The Social Problem
Despite the economic factors present the Muslim immigrant  population,  after
years of economic misfortune, began to recognize their own marginalization as a social
and  not  economic  problem.  Marked  by  unemployment,  unequal  educational
opportunities, poor living conditions, and difficulty with police, Muslim immigrants and
their decedents still struggle with the same issues today that they struggled with in the
post-economic boom of the 1970s. Hargeaves, et al. attribute this problem to a failure of
integration.  The very expressions  of  Muslim culture,  which  consolidated  Meghrebis
immigrant communities, set them apart from French citizens due to the socio-cultural
French  norm  of  läicité that  excludes  religious  expression  from  the  public  sphere.
Outward expressions of the Muslim faith including the hijab, public prayers, and the
requirement of special halal butcher shops are offensive in secular France.201 Aida, et al.
suggest that the French general population and Muslims in France act negatively toward
one another in a way that mutually reinforces distaste. They describe this phenomenon
as the “discriminatory equilibrium”. They show evidence that many employers are less
inclined to hire Muslims because some Muslim immigrants have needs that make them
less  desirable  on  the  labor  market.  Some  needs  of  devout  Muslims  could  be
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inconvenient  for  the  employer  and problematic  in  the  workplace,  such as  requiring
prayer breaks, requiring special meals that may have to be provided by some employers,
fasting that could lead to physical weakness and dangerous situations in some fields,
and particular clothing that may not match with dress codes or uniforms. Aida, et al
calls  this  “rational  Islamophobia”.  They  then  show evidence  that  “taste-based  non-
rational  Islamophobia”,  which they define as simple,  personal,  distaste for Muslims,
also  feeds  into  discrimination  on the  job  market.  Then,  Muslim perceptions  of  this
religious-based hostility  and discrimination  causes  a  deeper  divide  between Muslim
populations and the general French population.202 
Nora  Fellag  suggests  that  this  is  not  a  problem  of  integration,  but  with
identification. She states that Muslim immigrants are identified primarily as “Muslims”
instead  of  primarily  as  “French.”203 According  to  Plenel,  Muslims  in  France  have
currently  taken  the  place  previously  occupied  by  the  Jewish  community,  as  the
scapegoats for resentment. Plenel suggest that “for leaders such as Marine Le Pen, and
Donald Trump, Islamophobia today fulfills the cultural function that fell yesterday to
anti-Semitism,  in  the  last  crisis  of  Western  modernity:  to  impose  the  ideological
hegemony  of  a  national  identity  of  exclusion  and  rejection,  intolerant  toward
minorities”.204 This suggests not only a pattern of scapegoating minorities, but that the
scapegoating minorities has become a central part of the French identity. 
Aside  from scapegoating,  Adida  et  al.  suggest  that  because  of  France  has  a
Christian heritage, Islam is perceived as a threat to the future of the French identity.
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That is to say, that because French people have historically been Christians, Christianity
remains central to the French identity, and the growth of Islam in France threatens to
change that identity205. They argue that despite  laïcité, the general French population
relies heavily on religion when making choices, specifically when choosing a leader.
Adida, et al. conducted a research study in which participants were placed in groups of
eight along with either two Christian participants or Muslim participants. The religion
of the participants was not openly discussed, but all participants wore name tags, and
were  given  the  opportunity to  observe  each other’s  mannerisms,  dress,  and speech.
Participants  did  not  wear  religious  clothing  or  jewelry  that  indicated  religious
affiliation, except for one participant who wore a headscarf, indicating her affiliation
with Islam. The participants engaged in a “speed chatting” game that mimicked short,
every day, interactions with strangers. After meeting five participants, each participant
was asked to select one as a group leader who would be given a 30-euro prize and the
ability  to  divide  the  money  between  themselves  and  the  rest  of  the  group,  or
“electorate”. The results showed that differences and similarities of religion between the
voter and the candidate is the only significant variable regarding the voter’s choice of
candidate.  Therefore,  the  behavior  of  the  general  French  population  is  conditioned
towards a person based on the religious heritage of that person, and is biased toward
their own coreligionists206. When applied to everyday life, this research indicates that
Christianity  influences  French  society  in  a  way  that  is  harmful  for  the  successful
integration of non-Christian immigrants. Despite  laïcité secularism, French society is
205 Claire Aida, David Laitin, Marie-Anne Valfort, Why Muslim integration fails in Christian Heritage 
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still influenced by religion.  Laïcité may relieve the French from feeling obligated to
discuss religion openly, but it does not remove religion from public society.207
 This argument is consistent with the suggestion by Hargeaves, et al. that the
issues with Islamophobia in France are problems of integration. However, the problem
is not that French Muslims refuse to integrate or adopt French customs, as following
research conducted by Pew Research will show, but that France will not accept anything
short of assimilation, or a complete abandonment of Islamic customs, to be considered
integrated.208 Plenel suggests that this is a product of a perceived hierarchy of power
based on a culture that functions on the basis of exclusion and closure, that exists under
the guise of secularism in France.  Where yesterday the French identity was defined
juxtaposed against the Jewish community,  today it  is defined juxtaposed against the
Muslim community. 
Marginalization and Unrest 
The atmosphere of marginalization and discrimination that surrounds Muslim
populations in France have led to massive unrest within their communities. A clear lack
of economic opportunity specific  to phenotypical  Arabs and Muslims has sparked a
disinterest  in  educational  and  career  effort  among  Muslim  youth.209 This  lack  of
opportunity, combined with poverty, has led to frustration and ultimately violence. The
second  generation  of  Meghrebis  immigrants,  who  instead  self-identified  as  first
generation French citizens, began protesting for equal rights and better living conditions
in what was later called the Beur movement. The name Beur was coined according to
the popular French slang practice of reorganizing the letters of a noun, in this  case
207 Ibid. 
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Rebeau (Arab, or person of North African decent) is shortened and reorganized into
Beur. 210 
When the demands of the Beurs were ignored, their anger erupted into mass and
widespread riots. On October 25, 2005 then Interior Ministor Nicholas Sarkozy was
pelted  with  rocks  by  protesters  while  visiting  the  banlieues  of  Paris.  In  response,
Sarkozy publicly stated that the banlieues should be “cleaned with a power hose” and
refers  to  the  inhabitants  as  “rabble”.  Two  days  later,  in  the  atmosphere  of
disenfranchisement created by Sarkozy’s statements, teenagers Meghrebis Zyed Benna
and Bouna Traore were electrocuted after climbing into an electrical sub-station in the
Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois while allegedly attempting to hide from police. The
deaths of the teenagers triggered a violent reaction. Enraged arsonists began setting fire
to random vehicles, and riots began. In response, Sarkozy proposed a zero tolerance
policy, and sent police to stop the riots. The militarization of the police further angered
the protesters, who then escalated violence to protests beyond Paris, burning hundreds
of vehicles in Dijon, and spreading riots further to the east and west. The riots lasted
approximately  two weeks,  resulting  in  the  arson of  thousands  of  cars,  hundreds  of
arrests, and dozens of injured police.211
 In response to the October 2005 riots, the French government declared a state of
emergency, but did little to solve the cause of the outrage that incited the riots.212 The 
history of ethnic and religious-based inequality, exacerbated by the socio-economic 
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problems in the Meghrebis-French banlieues, has created a cycle of mass 
unemployment, poverty, and violence that contributes to a cycle of disenfranchisement 
the Meghrebis can rarely overcome.213 The French government has offered subsidies to 
aid poor families in the banlieues, but has not invested in the recovery of the areas. 
Because the French government refuses to invest in businesses within the banlieues, 
Qataris have taken the opportunity to do so in the hopes of financial returns while 
simultaneously supporting fellow members of the Muslim faith, fueling further 
disenfranchisement between the Meghrebis-French and the rest of France. Today, 
despite foreign investments and government subsidies, little has improved and the 
banlieues remain in a state of poverty.214 
Integration Efforts
Despite disenfranchisement and social exclusion, polls have revealed time and 
time again that Muslims in France desire integration. This is a distinctive trend among 
French Muslims as opposed to other European Muslims. Generally speaking, in 2006, 
58 percent of French Muslims viewed the relationship between Muslims and 
Westerners as bad. However, far more French Muslims (41 percent) viewed this 
relationship as good than British Muslims and German Muslims.215 
This could be due to the fact that according to the same poll, French Muslims 
more closely agree with Western opinions than other European Muslims, including the 
Muslim populations in Spain, Germany, and Great Britain. For example, French 
213 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, and Michael J. Balz. "The October Riots in France: A Failed Immigration 
Policy or the Empire Strikes Back?" International Migration 44, no. 2 (2006): 23-34
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Guardian, October 22, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/nothings-changed-10-
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frenchmuslim-connection/
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Muslims were evenly split (44 percent good and 46 percent bad) when asked if the 
victory of the radical Hamas group in Palestine was good for Palestine. British Muslims
responded decidedly in favor of the Hamas group victory, with 56 percent voting that it 
was good and 18 percent voting that it was bad, as did Spanish Muslims (57 percent 
voting that it was good and 22 percent voting it was bad). French Muslims were also 
heavily opposed (71 percent) to Iran’s Nuclear weapons programs, whereas British 
Muslims were split evenly (40 vs. 41 percent). Ninety-three percent of French Muslims 
also expressed no confidence in Osama bin Laden compared to only 63 percent of 
British Muslims. More French Muslims have favorable views of Christians and Jews 
than other European Muslims and those in predominantly Muslim nations. Ninety-one 
percent of French Muslims reported a favorable view of Christians, and 71 percent 
reported a favorable view of Jews. Seventy-one percent of British Muslims reported a 
favorable view of Christians and only 32 percent reported a favorable view of Jews. A 
similar trend was found in German Muslims (69 percent reported a favorable view of 
Christians and 38 percent reported a favorable view of Jews) and in Spanish Muslims 
(82 percent reported a favorable view of Christians but only 28 percent reported a 
favorable view of Jews). More French Muslims not only reported favorable views of 
Christians than other European Muslims, but much more than Muslims majority nations
such as Egypt (48 percent favorable of Christians and 2 percent favorable of Jews), 
Indonesia (64 percent favorable of Christians and 17 percent favorable of Jews), 
Pakistan (27 percent favorable of Christians and 6 percent favorable of Jews), Jordan 
(61 percent favorable of Christians and 1 percent favorable of Jews), and Turkey (16 
percent favorable of Christians and 15 percent favorable of Jews). More French 
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Muslims reported favorable views of Christians than even the American general 
population (88 percent favorable of Christians but 77 percent favorable of Jews) and the
general French population (87 percent favorable of Christians but 71 percent favorable 
of Jews).216 
French Muslims reported similar views toward religious groups and on 
important political issues as the general population of Western nation states. This 
indicates that many French Muslims share some central opinions as those shared in the 
West. This indicates that a mentality exists among Muslim immigrants that could 
facilitate integration in France. 
In 2006, French Muslims reported that being both French and Muslim is not an 
issue, in contrast to indications that French Christians believe Islam is incompatible 
with the French identity217. Seventy-two percent of French Muslims expressed no 
problem being both Muslim and French. In Great Britain however, British Muslims 
were split almost evenly on the issue (47 percent perceived a conflict in being both 
British and Muslim, while 49 percent did not) and only 35 percent of the general British
population see no problem being devoted to both Britain and Islam in modern society. 
Furthermore, French Muslims were almost evenly split when asked if they considered 
themselves as a Muslim first or as a national citizen first (42 percent considered 
themselves national citizens first and 46 percent considered themselves Muslim first). 
This response was nearly identical to that of Americans, when ask if they identify as 
national citizens or as Christians first (48 percent identified as national citizens first, and
42 percent identified as Christians first). The nearly split response of French Muslims 
216 Jodie Allen, “The French-Muslim Connection: Is France Doing a Better Job at Integration than its 
Critics?” Pew Research Center, August 17, 2006, http://www.pewresearch.org/2006/08/17/the-
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was remarkably different from other European Muslims, such as British Muslims 81 
percent of whom identify as Muslims before they identify as British. This is almost 
directly opposite of French Muslims, whom 83 percent of self-identify as French rather 
than Muslim. This is evidence that the majority of French Muslims are making efforts 
toward integration, desire to identify as French, and suggests the idea that Islam is 
incompatible with French values and the larger French society due to Muslim resistance
is unfounded. 
Despite the Pew Research public opinion polls indicating a growing national 
identity among the French Muslim population, there is some evidence of an increasing 
Islamic identity among younger French Muslims. Only 40 percent of French Muslims 
under 35 years old identified primarily as French while 51 percent identified first as 
Muslim and only 7 percent identified as both equally. Comparatively, 45 percent of 
French Muslims 35 years old and older self-identify as primarily French, 36 percent as 
primarily Muslim and 16 percent as both equally. All age groups reported a preference 
for adopting French customs (78 percent of French Muslims), while only 53 percent of 
Spanish Muslims, 41 percent of British Muslims, and 30 percent of German Muslims 
reported a preference for assimilation.218 Across multiple indicators, Laurence and 
Vaisse find that a “French Islam” is rapidly replacing “Islam in France”. They report 
increased use of French language in the homes of Muslim immigrants, increased mixed 
marriages (between immigrants and French citizens), an increase in the number of 
Muslim immigrant women who work outside the home, and an increase in Muslim 
immigrants who state claim to have non-Muslim friends. Most significantly, they point 
218 Jodie Allen, “The French-Muslim Connection: Is France Doing a Better Job at Integration than its 
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out that self-declared Muslims have expressed their desire to integrate in a multitude of 
polls. They point out that Islam is a constantly changing and adapting all over the 
world, and is not centrally one expression but what individual Muslims make of it.219 
According to these indicators, the idea that Islam is incompatible with the larger 
French society due to a lack of integration efforts is unfounded. Public opinion polls, 
and an increase in mixed marriages, employed Muslim women, and diversifying social 
circles among the French Muslim population all indicate that Muslims in France have 
been making substantial efforts to integrate themselves. These efforts have been met 
with social rejection and economic marginalization from the French general population, 
indicating that integration failures for French Muslims are not the products of effort 
from the Muslim population, but a product of inaccessibility within French society. One
of the clearest examples of social rejection of Muslim population in France is the 
growth of The National Front political party. 
The National Front
One of the most significant indicators of Islamophobia in France is the 
popularity of the National Front political party that has grown during the previous 
presidential election. The anti-immigration National Front party candidate Marine Le 
Pen specifically named Islam as an immigration and security issue. The current party is 
similar to its predecessor according to Plenel who suggests that “the rise in power of the
National Front, beginning in 1984 as clearly anti-Semitic and returning today as clearly 
anti-Islamic”, has not only validated the xenophobic and racist images of Islam through 
its isolationist international policies, but has both fed, and fed upon, the fears of the 
219 Jonathan Laurence, Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam Political and Religious Challenges in 
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nation in light of the terrorist attacks in Paris and across France.220 Islamophobia has 
replaced anti-Semitism as a re-contextualizing agent for racist legislation, namely the 
use of fears of radical Islam as a legitimate argument against immigration that does not 
have legal ramifications.221 Louis Aliot, Vice-President of the National Front stated that 
“neither immigration or Islam is a glass ceiling” that “de-demonizing only concerns 
anti-Semitism…it is only anti-Semitism that prevents people from voting for [the 
National Front]”.222 Former Interior Minister (who became Prime Minister in 2014) 
Manuel Valls stated that France would face “three challenges over the next ten years” 
and he named those challenges, “immigration due to African demographics, the 
compatibility of Islam with Democracy, and the problems raised by immigrant workers 
being joined by their families”.223 All three of these problems are clear statements 
regarding the perceived “Muslim problem”, and were presented as the three most 
important current French issues. In 2010, Nicolas Sarkozy famously targeted “criminals
of a foreign origin” in a speech delivered in Grenoble while pledging to remove the 
nationality of any specifically foreign born person who assaulted any person of public 
authority, but did not include domestically born citizens.224 As in the United States, the 
rhetoric used by political candidates and Democratically elected leaders in France 
would be powerless if it was not made significant by media exposure. Because 
islamophobic rhetoric used by these influential leaders is widely covered by the media, 
it then influences public opinion. 
220 Edwy Plenel, For the Muslims: Islamophobia in France. (Brooklyn, NY. Verso., 2016).






 A meta-analysis of media coverage across Europe and The United States 
showed that both countries portrayed Muslims in a stereotypical fashion and as a threat 
to security.225 Aida, et al. discusses the existence of non-rational Islamophobia within 
French society, and describes it as a phenomenon inspired by “unfounded and 
exaggerated racist clichés perpetuated by conspiracy based theories within popular 
media that feed fear and distaste of Muslims in France”.226 Therefore, Anti-Muslim 
discrimination in France is first based on negative stereotypes that are spread by the 
media. The mass media plays a central role in the spread of stereotypes, and can 
therefore be considered responsible for the stereotypical representation of Islam and 
Muslims. Islam is often portrayed as a homogenous group of religious zealots that are 
misogynistic and irrationally violent.227 
Plenel agrees that racism and xenophobia are not generated spontaneously, but 
are a direct result of the environment created by those with influential power. The 
National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH) released a statement 
along with their 2014 national report stressing the importance of the language used 
regarding immigrants and minorities, and advocating strongly for the public to ardently 
defend minorities against racist statements and harshly correct the perpetrators of racist 
language.228 Plenel points out that the growth of Islamophobic propagation in the media 
is related to a growing tolerance for everyday racist speech and acts of discrimination. 
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While acknowledging the existence of both Islamophobia in the common daily acts of 
the public and in the language of the media, Plenel does not infer a specific 
directionality, but suggests that the spread and perpetuation of islamophobia is cyclical 
between influential people, the media, and the public. 229.However, she does state that 
Islamophobia today is the result of perceptions of Islam that is “above all the 
responsibility of the mass media, which is where representations are spread in the form 
of obvious truths, stigmatizing a population of men, women, and children”.230 By 
stigmatizing Muslims into a general, violent, criminal, population the mass media has 
turned the Muslims of France into the ‘enemy within’ that is wholly responsible for the 
behavior of every person who identifies as Muslim or is phenotypically Arab. 
A meta-analysis of 345 published studies focused on the media representation of
Islam and Muslims found a worldwide negative reframing of Muslims after the 
September 11th 2001 attacks in New York. This included a shift in the common theme 
of representation of Muslims as ‘terrorists’, ‘extremists’, ‘fundamentalists’, ‘radicals’ 
and ‘fanatics’.231 The findings also revealed a common association between Muslims 
and the term “terrorism” which has been fundamental in the development of 
Islamophobia. Studies also found that terrorist attacks were the events that caught the 
attention of national media outlets, and therefore shaped the public’s negative stance 
toward Islam. These events include the murder of Theo Van Gogh in 2004, the 7/7 
terrorist attacks in London and the Glasgow International airport attacks in 2007, and 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in 2014. While commanding the attention of the 
public as catalysts to the spread of global Islamophobia, these events also sparked 
229 Ibid. 
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scholarly research.232 The research study also observed that anti-Muslim prejudice has 
been increasingly associated with the anti-Muslim language in the media, and were 
specifically driven by perceived security threats, and threats to national identity. Finally,
the study found that according to the 2016 European Islamophobia Report, 
Islamophobia has increased in every sphere of the research including political 
environment, media outlets, on the streets, and in business.233 
Just as the research on the politic rhetoric and media connection found in The 
United States, when islamophobic language is used be influential political leaders that 
are widely covered by the media, the public perception of Islam and Muslims is 
negatively influenced. In the French case, there is direct evidence that anti-Islam 
prejudice increased following exposure to negative media information among French 
citizens. Just as in the United States, the media publicizes information but does not 
create information, meaning there is another source for Islamophobic language. Just as 
in the United States, that language comes from political leaders, whose influential 
power makes islamophobic language even more dangerous and impactful that it is on its
own. 
Conclusion
Laïcité in France is a policy of separation that attempts to protect the 
public sphere from proselytism and the influence of religion. This means the expression 
of religion in public is strictly prohibited by a socio-cultural norm so strong that it is 
central to the French identity itself. Though this policy has served to protect religious 
freedom in France by attempting to remove it from public view, it has not successfully 
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protected all religions fairly. Laïcité as it is, specifically excludes Islam in France 
because of the inherent public nature of Islam, evidenced by religious clothing, halal 
butcher shops, and public prayers. Though the French government has made some 
attempts to include Islam in the French identity, it has done little to end the economic 
problems in the Muslim majority banlieues which have served to disenfranchise French 
Muslim immigrants. The marginalization of French Muslims is further exacerbated by 
social rejection from the French public who identify as a secular people under laïcité, 
furthering the disenfranchisement of Muslims and facilitating integration problems. The
French case serves as further evidence that policies of separation, even policies that take
completely different directions while attempting to separate government and religion, 
are unsuccessfully in treating all religions fairly under the law, and in creating 
environment in which cultural integration can succeed. 
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Chapter 3
A Case Study of Islamophobia in Canada 
Under Multiculturalism
Canada has a religious history similar to the U.S. and France, in that it is heavily
influenced by Christianity. Canada was originally colonized by the French in 1608, who
brought with them their traditional Roman Catholicism. The British later colonized 
parts of Canada in 1670 bringing Protestantism, making these two forms of Christianity 
the majority religious affiliations.234 Adherence to either of these two forms of 
Christianity was historically broken down on linguistic lines, since the majority of 
British English speakers were protestant and the majority of French-speaking French 
colonizers practiced Catholicism.235 Christianity, more specifically Protestantism and 
Catholicism, remain the majority religions today.236 According to the Pew Research 
Center’s overview of the changing religious landscape in Canada, in 1971 forty-one 
percent of Canadians identified as Protestant, 47 percent identified as Catholic, while 
only 4 percent identified as other than Christian and only 4 percent identified as 
religiously unaffiliated. By 2011, only 27 percent identified as Protestant, 39 percent 
identified as Catholic, 11 percent identified as other than Christian, and 24 percent 
identified as unaffiliated with religion. According to the Pew Research Center, 69 
percent of Canadians identified as Christian in 2010, while less than 1 percent identified
as Buddhist, 1.2 percent as affiliated with a Folk Religion, 1.4 percent Hindu, 1 percent 
234 “Early History of Canada”, The Canada Guide, 2018, http://www.thecanadaguide.com/history/early-
history/
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Jewish, 2.1 percent Muslim, less than 1 percent “other” religions, and 23.7 percent 
unaffiliated with any religion.237 Pew Research projects that by 2020, Christian 
affiliation will be reduced to 66.4 percent, Buddhism will grow to 1 percent, Folk 
religions will remain at 1.2 percent, Hinduism will rise to 1.7 percent, Jewish affiliation 
will increase to 1.1 percent, Muslims will grow to 2.8 percent, “other” religious 
affiliation will increase to 1.2 percent, and no affiliation with any religion will increase 
to 24.5 percent.238 Though Christianity is, and is projected to remain, the large religious 
majority, non-Christian religions, and affiliation with no religion are rising in Canada. 
One explanation for the increasing popularity of non-Christian religions could 
be a shift in immigration trends, and with it the influx of more non-Christian religious 
practitioners. Approximately 20 percent of the total population in Canada is made up of 
immigrants born in another country. In the 1970s and 1980s, the immigrant population 
in Canada was smaller, mostly European, and dominantly Christian. In recent years, 
almost half of the immigrant population of Canada has come from Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East. Immigrants in Canada from 1971-1980 were 20 percent unaffiliated with 
religion, 23 percent other than Christian, 32 percent Catholic, and 24 percent Protestant.
From 2001-2011 immigrants in Canada were 21 percent unaffiliated with religion, 39 
percent other than Christian, 22 percent Catholic, and 17 percent Protestant.239 
Immigrants shifted from a Christian majority of 56 percent down to 39 percent, and the 
number of non-Christian immigrants rose from 23 percent to 39 percent. By 1991 Islam 
in Canada had grown by 158 percent, Hinduism by 126 percent, Sikhism by 118 percent
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and Buddhism by 215 percent.240 The most recent available census information on 
religion was collected in 2011, and indicates that Islam has grown in Canada. 
According to Statistics Canada 210,680 immigrants that relocated to Canada between 
1991 to 2000 identified as Muslim. That number grew to 387,590 between 2001 to 
2011, indicating that more immigrants self-identify as Muslim than before241. The 
growth of Islam and non-Christian religions in Canada created an increasingly 
multicultural religious environment in Canada.242 The diversifying religious landscape 
of Canada has and continues to call for a universal and inclusive national policy on 
religious and cultural diversity. To accommodate this continuously diversifying Canada,
multicultural policy was established in the 1970s 
Multiculturalism in Canada
Will Kymlicka describes multiculturalism as a framework for state-minority 
relations that increases the “internationalization” of the state.243 Kymlicka suggests that 
minority populations have been victimized by traditional Westphalian sovereignty, in 
that policies of assimilation and exclusion have been imposed upon them in the name of
creating homogenous nation states.244 The Multicultural model is a collection of social 
integration practices used in many countries, including Sweden, The Netherlands, 
Australia, and New Zealand, among others, that focuses on the integration of unique 
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cultural practices into the general population and not on the assimilation of practices 
into a single, central, predetermined, identity. Multiculturalism “views diversity as an 
enduring reality and defining feature of the polity, and views tolerance as a core 
value”.245 Cultural assimilation, the predecessor to multiculturalism, took generations, 
often only showing results when early generation immigrants died off leaving their 
younger, localized, descendants to maintain practices and traditions from places in 
which many had never lived. Assimilation often only allowed certain parts of individual
cultures to survive, such as language, leaving other traditional practices to fade into 
obscurity. Multiculturalism on the other hand, encourages the inclusion of all parts of 
individual culture in forming a new central national culture, instead of sacrificing 
practices and traditions to more closely imitate the status quo.246 Kymlicka and Banting 
identify eight policies that are most exemplary of immigration multiculturalism, and 
determine the multicultural level of states based on adherence to the following policies; 
(1) constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, 
at the central and/or regional and municipal levels (2) the adoption of 
multiculturalism in school curricula (3) the inclusion of ethnic 
representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing (4) 
exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday closing legislation etc. (5) allowing dual 
citizenship (6) the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural 
activities (7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction (8) 
affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups247
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According to these parameters, Canada is considered strongly Multicultural (by 
adopting six or more of these policies), whereas the United States is modestly 
Multicultural (by adopting three to five policies) and France is in the majority of 
Western states that have strongly resisted the trend by adopting few if any of these 
policies.248 Multiculturalism is unique to each country that implements its practices, but 
Canada is perhaps one of the most dedicated to multiculturalism, in that Canada is one 
of the few countries that has included multiculturalism in its constitution.249 Section 27 
of the Constitution Act of 1982 states, “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians”.250 This constitutional amendment has formed the foundation of how 
Canada approaches diversity.251 In the 1960s, Canada began to shift its attitude toward 
the inclusion of different cultures by changing its immigration policies. Canada began 
to adopt a more multicultural conception of integrating immigrants by expecting them 
to celebrate their cultural diversities, an attitude that replaced prior assimilationist 
policies that expected immigrants to abandon their own customs and to adopt local 
customs instead. Canada went a step further by adopting a race-neutral immigration 
admissions and naturalization policy. The central government of Canada made the shift 
in attitude toward immigrants official when they declared multiculturalism to be the 
official policy.252 
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The inclusion of multiculturalism in the constitution is a loud statement against 
discrimination. It is not only paramount for the inclusion and protection of minority 
communities, but paves the way for the creation of a successfully multicultural identity. 
However, the simple inclusion of multiculturalism in the nation’s charter may not be as 
influential as its interpreted has been. In 1965 Prime Minister Lester Pearson called for 
a “new unhyphenated Canadianism” that is an identity all its own, and not French-
Canadian or British-Canadian. To accomplish this new identity, a national cohesion 
needed to be established. Pearson stated “We must become increasingly proud of the 
composition and character of our people – the French part, the English part, and the 
third force (Canadians of neither British or French origin)”.253 Mann describes this as a 
“groundbreaking statement” in that it was the first time a democratically elected leader 
described Canada as a multiracial society.254 The White Paper on Immigration Act was 
put into practice in 1967, shortly after this statement, which established the new non-
discriminatory immigration points system. In the 1960s and early 1970s 
multiculturalism took the place of the new national identity that Pearson had been 
calling for when Pierre Trudeau replaced Pearson as Prime Minister in 1968 and began 
expanding multiculturalism. Trudeau stated that immigrants did not simply fit into 
French-Canadian or British-Canadian groups, but brought their own unique cultures 
with them to Canada, and that he was impressed by Canada’s “precious opportunity to 
demonstrate the advantages of dissimilarity and the richness of variety”.255 When 
Trudeau announced his government’s decision to introduce a Multicultural policy, he 
Unique?" Constitutional Forum 13, no. 1 (2003): 2003-1: 1-8.
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stated that, “National identity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, 
must be founded on confidence in one’s own individual identity”.256 Thus, 
multiculturalism was established not only as a part of the Canadian constitution but as a 
central part of Canadian identity. 
Mann points out that integration cannot be successful unless it is supported by 
both immigrants and the general population they will become a part of.257 In this sense, 
the inclusion of multiculturalist attitudes as a central part of national identity is almost 
obligatory to facilitate a successful and truly multicultural state. Currently, following 
the election of Donald Trump in the U.S., the near election of Marine le Pen in France, 
as well as other indicators, the West has experienced a rise in support for a stricter 
nationalism that is exclusive, and focuses the blame for national and even global 
problems on immigrants. Though that is a trend in many parts of the West, Canada 
remains dedicated to multiculturalism. Following the welcoming of 35, 000 Syrian 
Refugees, the Environics Institute conducted a poll in which 62 percent of Canadians 
disagree that “immigration levels are too high”.258 However, since the election of 
Donald Trump, Canadian opinion of the U.S. has plummeted, with only 44 percent of 
Canadians expressing favorable views of the U.S., a number that has declined from 
percentages in the 70s in 2012.259 
Multiculturalism is clearly not without criticisms. This is made evident by the 
minority of Canadians who do believe immigration levels are too high.260 One of the 
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most prevalent criticisms surrounds issues of national security, based on the argument 
that enemies of Canada may be allowed access to Canada more easily due to 
Multicultural immigration policies. This concern became especially prevalent in 2005 
following public transportation bombings in London that were perpetrated by second 
generation immigrants.261 In response, Kymlicka has several arguments. First, he argues 
that Canada is geographically fortunate, in that it is not physically attached to states that
can be seen as enemies. Sheer physical distance is a protective factor for Canada. 
Canada implements a strenuous vetting process for immigrants and refugees that takes 
years, requires official United Nations refugee status (when applicable), includes 
multiple background checks, and face-to-face interviews.262 While home grown terrorist
cells have been found within states with strong multicultural policies, Kymlicka points 
out that they have been found in states with moderate multicultural policies like the 
United Kingdom and the United States, and also in states that are ideologically opposed 
to multiculturalism, like France.263 
Comparatively, both the American and the French identities are centered around 
their historic traditions and policies that rely on the separation between religion and the 
State, which I have argued has created integration problems for other than Christian 
minority groups, specifically Muslims. Canada has centered its identity around a policy 
that is inclusive instead of separate and in doing so has superseded some of the social 
problems that come when integrating people who have different religious beliefs. 
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Though it has been suggested that security issues have become a product of 
multiculturalism in Canada, the same security issues exist within states with very 
different policies as well. This suggests that factors other than multiculturalism are 
more likely responsible for security issues within those states. 
Hate Crimes in Canada
However, Canadian multiculturalism has not entirely solved the social problem 
with integration. Though multiculturalism has shown success in reducing some inter-
group inequality, it has not worked the same for every group.264 Since 9/11, immigrants 
from Arab or Muslim countries have faced unique discrimination and been pressured to 
hide their ethnic and religious identities in Canada as well as the U.S.265 Despite this, 
Kymlicka cites that studies have found lower levels of intolerance and better outcomes 
for immigrant youth in states with liberal multicultural policies that in states without 
them. These studies have also found that the states with the strongest multicultural 
policies, namely Canada and Australia, have the best record for the economic and 
political integration of immigrants of the last 30 years.266 The evidence from these 
studies has shown that multiculturalism tangibly improves the integration of immigrant 
minority groups, though race and religious based discrimination problems still arise in 
Canada. These problems are most evident through Canada’s hate crime statistics.
In 2016 there were a total of 182 incidents of hate crimes against Muslims in 
Canada. One Hundred and thirty-nine of these incidents were reported by police to the 
OSCE ODIHR. This number includes threats, vandalism, disturbance of the peace, and 
physical assaults. Forty-three more incidents of hate crimes against Muslims were 
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys : Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity. 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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collectively reported by civil society, international organizations, and the Holy See. 
This included 18 threats, 18 attacks on property, and 7 physical assaults.267 In 2015 there
were a total of 184 incident of hate crimes against Muslims in Canada. One hundred and
forty-eight of these cases were reported by police. Thirty-six of these cases were 
reported by civil society, international organizations, and the Holy See, and included 19 
attacks against property, 5 threats, and 12 physical assaults.268 In 2014 there were a total
of 123 incidents of hate crimes against Muslims in Canada. Ninety-nine of these were 
reported by police, while 24 were reported by civil society, international organizations, 
and the Holy See. These 24 incidents included 18 attacks against property, 1 threat, and 
5 physical assaults.269 This represents a steady increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes since 
2012. There were a total of 51 Anti-Islamic hate crimes in Canada in 2012. This number
rose to 76 the following year, 2013. The number of anti-Islamic hate crimes then 
increased to 133 in 2014270. Statistics Canada reports a 5 % increase in hate crimes in 
Canada between 2014 and 2015, which they report is largely due to an increase in 
incidents specifically targeting Muslims. 
Police reported 469 Criminal Code incidents in 2015 that were motivated by 
hatred of religion in general, 40 more incidents than in 2014, and accounting for 35 
percent of hate crimes in Canada in 2015. Police reported a 61 percent increase in hate 
crimes targeting Muslims in 2015, which accounted for 12 percent of hate crimes in 
Canada in 2015. Police also reported a 33 percent increase in hate crimes targeting Arab
and West Asian populations in 2015. Police also reported an increase in hate crimes 
267 OSCE ODHIR, “Hate Crime Reporting: Canada,” http://hatecrime.osce.org/canada
268 OSCE ODHIR, “Hate Crime Reporting: Canada 2015,” http://hatecrime.osce.org/canada?year=2015
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against women in 2015 making women the majority victims, which went from 40% (of 
total hate crimes) in 2014 to 53 percent (of total hate crimes) in 2015. This was 
attributed to an increase in crimes against Muslim women, who are sometimes more 
easily identified as Muslim than men.271 The large increase between 2014 and 2015 may
be a significant jump, but it is not a variation in the overall pattern of islamophobic hate 
crimes in Canada over the last decade. The number of hate crimes targeting Muslims in 
Canada has more than tripled since 2012.272 
Incidents of anti-Muslim hate crimes have been specifically significant in 
Quebec, according to Global News Canada’s timeline of anti-Muslim hate crimes. Their
account includes smashed windows and torched cars in a parking lot outside the 
Outaouais Islamic Centre in Gatineau in 2012, graffiti on the same centre depicting the 
star of David and the words, “Vive David” along with “Fuck Arab” and “Fuck Halal”, 
and a threatening email received by the president of the Mosque of Aylmer in which the
sender demanded that all Muslims leave Canada. In 2013 a mosque was splattered with 
pig’s blood, a halal butcher shop was vandalized three times in seven months, including 
gunshots through its plate glass windows and signs reading “no to Islam” scattered 
inside. In 2014 the Centre Culturel Islamique de Quebec, and other mosques, received 
messages reading “Islam, get out of my home”, and in 2016 someone left a giftwrapped 
decapitated pig’s head outside the door of the same Centre Culturel.273 
Though these hate crimes are severe and unacceptable, the overall islamophobic 
hate crime statistics in Canada are considerably lower than that of both the United 
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States and France over a five-year period. In a per capita comparison of the United 
States, France, and Canada, there were fewer anti-Islamic hate crimes in Canada every 
year between 2012 and 2016.
Table 1: Hate Crimes Per Capita Compared 
Year United States France Canada
2012 4.140 4.371 1.467
2013 4.269 4.560 2.162
2014 4.834 2.005 3.461
2015 9.379 5.043 5.135
2016 9.500 7.923 5.018
 This may indicate that multiculturalism, and the universal human rights culture 
it has helped develop, combined with the legal protections it provides, has significantly 
impacted the success of immigrant integration.274 The drastic difference between the 
instances of hate crimes against Muslims in the United States and France versus Canada
could be explained by several causes including, the media exposure of Muslims, the 
rhetoric surrounding Muslims used by the democratically elected leaders in Canada, and
the differences within the policies that govern the relationship between religions and the
government in Canada. 
Being Muslim in Canada: The Impact of Islamophobia
Though Canada often enjoys an international reputation of cultural acceptance 
and successful immigrant integration, not all immigrant groups in Canada feel the same.
Since September 11, 2001 a multitude of issues surrounding Muslims have arisen, 
including the use of religious law in government courts (which was tried and denied by 
the Canadian government), concerns over homegrown terrorism (following the arrest of 
274 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys : Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity. 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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18 people in Toronto suspected of terrorist action), and the wearing of traditional 
Muslim clothing during the Canadian citizenship ceremony (which was tried in court 
and allowed).275 Steven Zhou points out that despite Canada’s multicultural laws and 
identity, not every Canadian agrees with the policy. To exemplify this, Zhou compiled a
list of six significant anti-Islamic hate groups in Canada including, ultra-Zionist group 
Never Again Canada, Far Right Zionist group Jewish Defense League Canada, anti-gay 
and anti-Muslim hate group Rise Canada, anti-Islam-alarmist group Canadian Coalition 
of Concerned Citizens, a Canadian Chapter of the German based anti-Islam group 
Pegida called Pegida Canada, and Soldiers of Oden Canada, a branch of a northern-
European anti-immigration white supremacist group.276 
An issue that may be driving biased opinion of Muslims is what Bayoumi calls 
“the racing of religion” in which Islam is treated like a single minority race, and 
mistreated as one, instead of recognized as a global religion that includes practitioners 
of all different races and from all different regions of the world.277 The Muslim 
communities in Canada include a plurality of South Asian people (36 percent) and 
Arabs (21 percent); but also include significant numbers that are West Asian (e.g., 
Persian), Black, and South East Asian Muslims as well.278 Despite the treatment of 
Muslims as a single, homogenous community, more Canadians that self-identify as 
Muslims indicate that their religion (84 percent) and nationality (81 percent) are “very 
important” parts of their identity, but fewer indicate that their ethnic backgrounds are 
275 John McCoy, Anna Kirova, and W. Knight, "Gauging Social Integration among Canadian Muslims: A 
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“very important” (48 percent).279 This indicates that for the majority of Canadian 
Muslims, religion and nationality are important parts of their personal identities, but 
ethnic background is less so. 
McCoy, Kirova, and Knight compiled quantitative data from the Envrionics 
Institute’s Survey of Muslims in Canada (conducted both in 2006 following debates 
over the implementation of Sharia Law in Ontario; and in 2016 following election 
debates over the acceptance of Syrian refugees in Canada) with qualitative data from 
Muslim community leaders, and qualitative data from the Ethnic Diversity Study 
(conducted in 2002 following the rise of Islamophobia after the 9/11 attacks).280 Their 
study found that Canada stands apart from the immigration, integration, and 
multicultural problems of other nations states because “the far right in Canada is 
relegated to the fringes of party politics and civil society and it is difficult to detect an 
explicit anti-immigrant discourse among the Canadian media and politicians”. Ambrose
and Mudde suggest that the Canadian radical right has failed to gain political influence 
because of Canadian multiculturalism. They suggest that Canadian multiculturalism is 
unique because cultural cooperation is celebrated as a central part of Canadian identity. 
This, combined with government policies protecting the inclusion of minorities has 
stopped both the supply and demand of Canadians interested in right wing extremist 
politics281. 
McCoy, et al. also point out that social scientists credit Canada’s Multicultural 
policy with the success of integration. The authors quote social scientist Jeffrey Reitz 
279 Ibid.
280 John McCoy, Anna Kirova, and W. Knight, "Gauging Social Integration among Canadian Muslims: A 
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who stated, “In short, findings from public opinion and other survey research suggests 
that for most Canadians, support for multiculturalism is an expression of support for the
idea of Canada as a country committed to immigration and its benefits… popular 
multiculturalism is a pro-immigration ideology”.282 This idea is confirmed by Azar 
Syed, of the BC Muslim Association, believes the Canadian multicultural policy has 
made integration in Canada easier, stating, “I moved here in ‘73 and that time, if I 
compare it to the later years, the 70s were very hard for the immigrants, maybe because 
the multicultural philosophy had not taken hold.... But later on in the 1980s everything 
was very smooth, there was hardly any discrimination....”.283 They go on to explain that 
integration is a reciprocal process in which both the newcomers and the host society 
must adapt to coexist. Research has indicated that successful integration is marked by a 
sense of belonging, not only a sense of attachment for the host country, but also must 
include feelings of acceptance from the general population of the host country.284 
According to Keith Banting, “Multiculturalism has helped nurture a more inclusive 
sense of national identity, one more capable of accommodating the diverse diversity of 
contemporary Canada”.285 Multiculturalism in Canada has created that foundation for 
social acceptance and reciprocity among the general population needed for successful 
immigrant integration. 
Considering these explanations of the parameters and measurement of social 
integration, the research of McCoy, et al. indicates high levels of social integration 
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among Muslims in Canada. When asked are they “satisfied with life” 49.3 percent of 
Canadian Muslims answered “very satisfied” while only 47.6 percent of the non-
Muslim Canadian population answered the same. Seventy-one percent of Canadian 
Muslims reported a very strong sense of attachment to Canada along with 71 percent of 
Canadian Protestants, while only 65 percent of Hindus, 59 percent of Jews, and 55 
percent of non-religious Canadians reported the same. The same amount of Canadian 
Muslims reported high levels of attachment to Canada as the majority status-quo 
Christian denomination, Canadian Protestants, did. Among Canadian Muslims, 32 
percent reported experiencing “discrimination in the last 5 years” in comparison to 37 
percent among Canadian Hindus, 31 percent among Canadian Buddhists and 23 percent
among Jehovah’s Witnesses. Most significantly, of the 32 percent of Canadian Muslim 
respondents, only 34 percent reported religion as the reason for discrimination in 
comparison to 70 percent of Canadian Jews and 75 percent of Jehovah Witnesses.286 
When asked, “Would you say you are very, somewhat, not very, or not at all proud to 
be a Canadian?” 83 percent of Canadian Muslims indicated they were “very proud” to 
be Canadian in 2016 (10 percentage points higher than responses from the 2006 
survey). By comparison, only 73 percent of the “non-Muslim” sample group indicated 
that they were “very proud” to be Canadian. When respondents were asked to describe 
their sense of belonging to Canada as either “very strong, generally strong, generally 
weak or very weak” 55 percent of Canadian Muslims reported a very strong sense of 
belonging and 39 percent expressed a “generally strong” sense of belonging (only 3 
percent identified themselves as having a “very weak” sense of belonging to Canada). 
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Following the 2016 survey, 58 percent of Canadian Muslims reported that their sense of
belonging has “become stronger” over the previous 5 years. Only 5 percent reported it 
had grown weaker. 
The fact that Canadian Muslims report higher or similar levels of national 
belonging as their more established Protestant counterparts, and higher levels of 
attachment to Canada, are strong indicators of successful integration of Canadian 
Muslims. This may suggest that legitimate multicultural policy at the government level 
and inclusive rhetoric from influential political leaders are central factors in avoiding 
feelings of alienation among Muslim immigrant populations. In 2016, ninety-four 
percent of Canadian Muslims reported a “very” or generally high sense of belonging, a 
ten percentage point increase from 2006 .287 It is especially significant that Muslims 
report consistent if not higher levels of attachment and belonging following 
controversial political incidents such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 2015 Syrian 
refugee crisis. This also indicates higher levels of integration for Muslims in Canada, 
but could also indicate that media representations of Muslims are more positive in 
Canada than in the United States or France. Canadians also report higher levels of 
support for immigrants in another important aspect of integration, economics. 
According to Ambrose and Mudde, Canadians are more likely to agree that immigrants 
make their country a better place to live and are good for the economy than other 
Western countries288. Despite this more positive perspective, economic discrimination 
against immigrants still exists in Canada. 
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Economics
A study of immigration economics by Ehsan Latif, completed in 2015, dispelled 
the suggestion that immigrants cause unemployment among nationally born citizens289. 
His study found that immigration did not have a significant long term effect on the 
Canadian unemployment rate290. In a similar study Asadul Islam found no significant 
evidence that immigration effects unemployment in Canada “in the long run”. Islam’s 
research also yielded results that indicate a positive relationship among per-capita gross 
domestic product, immigration rate, and real wages, indicating that Canadian born 
workers benefit from immigration in the long run.291 According to these research studies
immigration is good for Canada’s economic growth. 
However, Latif found evidence of discrimination in the Canadian job market. 
His study indicated that though Canada largely attracts skilled and educated immigrants,
many employers do not recognize international education or job experience, creating 
problems for immigrants on the job market.292 A study by Amanda Silliker published in 
2011 found that applicants with traditionally English sounding names were more likely 
to received call backs for interviews than their Greek, Indian, or Chinese-sounding 
named counterparts. Silliker conducted her study in three of the most multicultural 
cities in Canada, Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. Silliker’s study found English-
named people were 47 percent more likely to get a call back in Toronto, 39 percent 
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more likely in Montreal, and 20 percent more likely in Vancouver.293 Phillip Oreopoulos
conducted a similar study in 2009 which yielded similar results. In his study, changing 
only the name of an applicant from a traditionally English-sounding name to either an 
Indian, Pakistani, or Chinese name decreased the likelihood for a call-back by 28 
percent. He took his research a step further, adding information on multiple language 
fluency, including English, on the applications to see if the bias could be explained by 
employers concern over English language proficiency. The inclusions of language skills
did not increase call-back rates for foreign named applicants, suggesting that the name 
biases are not based on language proficiency, and are more likely based on racial 
discrimination.294
In 2018, labor market discrimination is still an issue for immigrants. Many 
skilled immigrants are unemployed, or working jobs they are over qualified for due to 
lack of opportunity. Discrimination, along with licensure and credential discrepancy 
issues, is largely explained by a lack of “Canadian experience”, meaning that employers
favor candidates for jobs who have education or work experience in Canada. This 
leaves immigrants at a serious disadvantage. In 2015 Statistics Canada found that 
economic immigrants in Canada earned a mean annual income of $42,000 while 
refugees earned a mean annual income of only $28,000 in 2015. 295 In comparison, the 
average for nationally born Canadians earned mean annual incomes between $63,457 
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and $70,336 in 2015.296 While Canada continues to accept refugees and immigrants, 
many of those that are accepted are still without adequate employment.297 
Though there are problems with economic integration in Canada, specifically 
with discrimination in the job market, Canada’s immigrant unemployment rate 
demonstrates more economic integration success than that of France. According to 
Statistics Canada, the overall unemployment rate for 2017 is 5.4. The overall 
unemployment rate for landed immigrants (those that have been granted the right to live
in Canada permanently) is 6.4.298 Though it is higher for immigrants than for the general
populations, this is a much smaller margin than the unemployment rates for immigrants 
in France. According to The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) the unemployment rate for the general population of France was 9.2 percent in 
2016, while the unemployment rate for immigrants in France was 17 percent in that 
same year.299 Comparatively, Canada has far more success for immigrant economic 
integration than France. This is evidence that integration in Canada is not only more 
socially successful, but economically successful as well. 
Media
An important factor for Islamophobia in Canada is the role and behaviors of the 
media. Poynting and Perry suggest that the media facilitates the enabling of “climates of
hostility” that surround groups, particularly Muslims and phenotypical Arabs.300 They 
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point out that “Muslim” and “Arab” are used interchangeably by the media, despite that 
fact that Islam is a religion practiced by people of all different racial and national 
backgrounds.301 Poynting and Perry agree with Ahmed and Matthes, who discuss that 
Muslims and phenotypical Arabs are treated homogenously in the media and often 
linked to violent incidents such as the Arab-Israeli War, and terrorism.302 This forces all 
Muslims, and even people who simply look Arab, into one single group that is 
perceived as a violent “other”.303 When an individual or a group is perceived as the 
“other” they are dehumanized and considered to be less deserving of fair treatment. 
Poynting and Perry argue that the media’s stereotypical representation of Islam and 
Muslims are more than insulting, but actually serve as a “guide to action” to the general 
population.304 They state that “almost invariably, the stereotypes are loaded with 
disparaging associations, suggesting inferiority, irresponsibility, immorality, and non-
humanness. Consequently, they provide both motive and rationale for injurious verbal 
and physical assaults on minority groups. Acting upon these interpretations allows 
dominant group members to recreate whiteness as superiority, while castigating the 
Other for their presumed traits and behaviors. The active construction of whiteness, 
then, exploits stereotypes to legitimate violence”.305 The media is specifically complicit 
because they fuel fear and shape public perceptions.306 
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Though Islamophobic rhetoric exists within the Canadian media, its impact on 
the public may be less severe than in the United States and France. In a comparison 
between Islamophobia in Canada and Australia, Poynting and Perry describe the effect 
of media stereotyping as “muted” and “almost ambiguous” in Canada, and credit this to 
two reasons. The first is attributed to a smaller populist media culture, which they 
describe as fewer “populist crusades” on talk radio, in tabloids, sensationalist 
commercials, and current affairs television. Dr. Abdolmohammed Kazemipur suggests 
that Muslims in Canada have fewer issues with the media than Muslims in other 
countries.307
 The second, is attributed to multiculturalism itself. The authors state that 
because of the Multiculturalism Act, there is a more established culture of cooperation 
regarding negotiations between pluralist cultures, and because of this, Canadian cultural
and political life has been less vulnerable to and has suffered less from neo-conservative
and right-wing populist attacks.308 Therefore, not only is multiculturalism facilitating 
cooperation between cultural groups among the populace, it also contributes to making 
the populace less vulnerable to sensationalist news or stereotyped perceptions of 
Muslims and Islam. 
Spokesperson for the National Council of Canadian Muslims Amira Elghawaby 
expresses deep concern regarding the increase in Islamophobic incidents reported to the 
organization in the last year. Despite the aforementioned research, she states that she 
has seen a spike in violent incidents against Muslims following Islamophobic rhetoric 
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during both Canadas election campaign and following the terrorist attacks in Paris in the
fall of 2015. Though the Canadian populace may be less influenced by stereotypical and
violent rhetoric against Muslims, they are not immune. She states that widespread use 
of the term “Islamic State” is impacting the perception of the whole Muslim community
in Canada, and is specifically problematic.309 
Political Rhetoric in Canada
McCoy, Kirova, and Knight pointed out that rhetoric practiced by political 
leaders in Canada is less severe toward Islam than in the U.S. or France. They state that 
the language of Canadian political leaders sets the example for both the media and the 
public, and could be a significant factor in the prevalence and intensity of Islamophobia 
in Canada.310 Poynting and Perry also suggest that Canadian political life has been less 
influenced by right wing populism due to Canada’s multicultural identity.311 However, 
islamophobic rhetoric from democratically elected leaders has been a problem in the 
past, most recently from former Prime Minister Stephen Harper who held office from 
2006 until 2015. He caused problems within the Canadian Muslim community during 
his leadership after publicly siding Canada with Israel regarding conflicts in the Middle 
East, and making multiple public statements and appearances showing support for the 
Canadian Jewish community while neglecting to show similar support for Canada’s 
Muslim citizens.312 According to Barry, this was part of a larger goal to gain votes from 
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the Jewish community, as opposed to the Muslim community, who were considered 
statistically less likely to vote.313 Keenan points out other instances in which Harper 
used Islamophobic rhetoric, including his veiled reference to “barbaric Culture” in 
which he referenced stereotyped Islamic practices such as forced marriages and honor 
killings, stating that it was “fear mongering” with the express intention of gaining 
votes.314 He states that Harper equating Syrian refugees to terrorists, and his campaign 
emphasis against the ban of Muslim traditional clothing, was done only for the purpose 
of vilifying Muslims. He suggests that revealing these attitudes against Muslims was 
done specifically following a public opinion poll which indicated that 82 percent of 
Canadians supported the ban on Muslim traditional clothing, and was therefore made to 
gain voter support.315 Despite former Prime Minister Harper’s islamophobic rhetoric, 
the study by McCoy, et al. demonstrated a rise in Muslim Canadian’s feelings of 
acceptance in Canada, a rise that occurred during Harper’s administration.316 This 
suggests that the general Canadian population has internalized multiculturalism as a part
of their identity enough, that they had an opposite reaction to Harper’s rhetoric than he 
intended. By the end of Harper’s administration in 2015, the majority of Canadians 
agreed that immigration levels were not too high.317 Compared to evidence of a positive 
correlation between leadership and public opinion in the U.S. and France, the Canadian 
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populace is influenced by the islamophobic or anti-multicultural rhetoric of leaders in 
the opposite direction. 
The election of Justin Trudeau is significant evidence that multiculturalism and 
cultural integration in Canada has been successful. Trudeau voiced support for the 
Muslim Canadian community while running for office by criticizing Harper’s stance on 
banning Muslim traditional clothing during Canadian citizenship ceremonies. Trudeau 
stated, "We are the one country in the world that has figured out how to be strong, not in
spite of our differences but because of them. So, the prime minister of this country has a
responsibility to bring people together in this country, not to divide us by pandering to 
some people's fears”.318 The Muslim community in turn helped Trudeau win the 
election, according to the envrionics institute who conducted a poll that found 65 
percent of Muslims who voted, and agreed to reveal their choices, voted for Trudeau in 
2015.319 Since his election, Trudeau has voiced support for the Muslim Canadian 
community many times. Following the attack on a Quebec City mosque, Trudeau 
offered words of support and solidarity directly to Canadian Muslims stating, “We will 
grieve with you, we will defend you, we will love you and we will stand with you” as 
well as stating, “Know that we value you. You enrich our shared country in 
immeasurable ways. It is your home”.320 During a convention he praised Canadian 
Muslims for their commitment to helping settle Syrian refugees and affirmed his 
commitment to them stating, “Canada is stronger because of the contributions of its 
318 Joan Bryden, “Justin Trudeau says Harper's pandering to fears about Muslims unworthy of a PM,” 
CBC News, February 20, 2015, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/justin-trudeau-says-harper-s-pandering-
to-fears-about-muslims-unworthy-of-a-pm-1.2964466
319 Éric Grenier, “Liberals won over Muslims by huge margin in 2015, poll suggests,” CBC News, April 
29, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/grenier-environics-muslims-politics-1.3555216
320 Ryan Maloney, “Trudeau Tells Canadian Muslims: 'We Will Love You and We Will Stand With 
You',” The Huffington Post Canada, January 30, 2017, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/01/30/trudeau-muslims-quebec-mosque-shooting_n_14501104.html
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Muslim community. We are stronger because of you. And that’s why every day we just 
chose hope over fear and stand up to the politics of hate and division”.321 He also 
released a statement wishing the Muslim community a happy Ramadan.322 Trudeau’s 
administration has gone beyond words in their commitment to stopping Islamophobia in
Canada by passing M-103 in the House of Commons, a non-binding motion that 
condemns Islamophobia and religious discrimination. The motion, authored by Liberal 
Parliament member Iqra Khalid, calls on the Canadian government to 1) condemn 
Islamophobia and all forms of systemic racism and religious discrimination 2) quell the 
increasing public climate of hate and fear 3) compel the Commons heritage committee 
to develop a government-wide approach for reducing or eliminating systemic racism 
and religious discrimination, including Islamophobia.323 The passing of M-103 is further
evidence of Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism, and commitment to the 
successful integration of Muslims specifically. 
Conclusion
Trudeau’s rhetoric surrounding Islam, his administration’s actions to protect 
Muslims, and Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism are staunchly different from 
the stances taken by the United States and France. The media coverage is different, the 
language of democratically elected leaders is different, but most importantly the root 
influential cause is different; multiculturalism. Multiculturalism as a policy that binds 
Canadian identity directly with cultural diversity. From the platform, political rhetoric is
more acceptant of Islam, media coverage is more fair to Islam, and the public is more 
321 Dalit Halevi, “Trudeau praises Canada's Muslim community,” Israeli National News, December 26, 
2016, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/222277
322 Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on Ramadan,” 
May 26, 2017, https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/05/26/statement-prime-minister-canada-ramadan
323 CBC News. “House of Commons passes anti-Islamophobia motion,” CBC News, March 23, 2017, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/m-103-islamophobia-motion-vote-1.4038016
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committed to supporting cultural differences and less influenced by racist and 
xenophobic statements or opinions from politicians and the media. These factors 
indicate that multiculturalism, once rooted as legitimate policy, creates the foundation 
for a more culturally inclusive nation. 
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Conclusion 
Religious Jurisprudence and Islamophobia 
According to hate crime statistics and public opinion polls it is clear that 
Islamophobia is present in each of the three case studies analyzed in this research. 
Islamophobia varies in each nation-state in important ways, including the politics 
surrounding Islam and the way that Islam is presented to the public by political leaders 
and the media. Most importantly, Islamophobia varies in its intensity and prevalence 
between the United States, France, and Canada. In the United States, anti-Islam hate 
crimes have ranged between 4.140 crimes per capita per 100,000 people in 2012 and 
risen steadily to 9.500 crimes per capita per 100,000 people in 2016. In France, anti-
Islam hate crimes were less constant, but at times higher than in the United States, with 
4.371 crimes per capita per 100,000 people in 2012, only 2.005 crimes per 100,000 
people in 2014, and then up to 7.923 crimes per capital per 100,000 people in 2016. In 
Canada, the statistics for anti-Islamic hate crimes were strikingly lower, ranging 
between only 1.467 crimes per capita per 100,000 people in 2012 and 5.018 crimes per 
capita per 100,000 people in 2016. The lower rates of crimes against Muslims in 
Canada is especially striking when those rates are controlled for population. This is 
because the significantly lower population in Canada compared to France and the 
United States may have accounted for the smaller number of hate crimes against 
Muslims, except that the number of hate crimes in Canada was still significantly lower 
when the comparison is controlled for population size. This suggests the presence of a 
factor that sets Canada apart from the United States and France regarding Islamophobia.
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Public opinion polls regarding Islam and the presence of Islam in each of the 
states also reveals higher levels of tolerance and acceptance among the general 
Canadian population that those in the United States or France. Canadians are more 
likely than Americans or the French to agree that Islam enriches Canada, its culture, its 
economy, and its people, and that Muslims are welcome members of society. Canadians
also express higher levels of tolerance for not only existing Muslim populations in 
Canada, but for the increase of those populations through immigration. This is a clear 
indication that factors are present that set Canada apart from the United States and 
France, in a way that creates a more culturally inclusive environment for Muslims. 
I have argued that media representation and political rhetoric surrounding Islam 
is an important factor for the prevalence and intensity of Islamophobia in the three case 
studies. In the United States and in France, the media has consistently equated Islam 
with “terrorism”, a term that has become charged with the power to illicit “terror” 
among the populace within itself. The media in the United States and France has 
consistently circulated stereotypical images of Muslims and Islam. Some media outlets 
have been found to actively search for way to associate criminal acts with Muslims and 
with Islam in general. The consistent circulation of islamophobic media, and 
stereotypical representations of Islam has perpetuated negativity toward Muslims and 
Islam within the general populations of The United States and France. Though the 
media has had a central role in the spread of Islamophobia, Islamophobic rhetoric did 
not originate with the media. The media received information and rhetoric from 
influential political leaders.
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In the United States and in France, violent crimes and acts of “terrorism” 
associated with Islam have been framed by democratically elected leaders and 
influential politicians to gain support for political endeavors and to influence the 
decisions of the populace. These incidents have been framed in specific ways by 
political leaders that have surrounded the image of Islam with violence, and 
Islamophobia has been spread throughout the general population by the media, but most
significantly Islamophobia has been legitimized in the United States and in France 
because the general populations have agreed with its stereotypical representation.
Though negative images of Islam are created by political leaders and spread by 
the media in all three cases, there are fewer far right political news outlets in Canada, 
and arguably less negative media attention on Islam than there is in the United States or 
France. However, Islam has still been framed in a negative and stereotypical way by 
both political leaders and the media in Canada. The significant difference between 
Americans, the French, and Canadians may not only be the amount of islamophobic 
language circulated in each state, but the reaction to those images. Despite attempted 
politicization of Islamophobia in Canada, the presence of anti-Muslim, anti-Islam, and 
anti-immigrant hate groups in Canada, and some stereotypical and negative media 
presentations of Islam, the majority of the general population of Canada still expresses 
support and welcome to Canadian Muslims and Muslim immigrants. In the United 
States and in France, the public reaction to the politicizing of Islamophobia, 
islamophobic language from political leaders, and the circulation of islamophobic 
stereotypes in the media, has been a rise in Islamophobia. This is made evident by an 
increase in hate crimes against Muslims and Islam, public expressions of the rejection 
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of Muslims and Islam via public opinion polls, and the rise of far right anti-immigration
and expressed anti-Muslim political parties such as the American Donald Trump 
administration and the near election of National Front leader Marine le Pen in France. 
Whereas in Canada Justin Trudeau, who has openly voiced support for Canada’s 
Muslim population and the acceptance of increased numbers of refugees, was elected as
Prime Minister. The public opinion polls, the apparent lack of effect of negative media 
portrayals, and the political choices of Canadians again suggests the presence of a factor
that sets Canada apart from the United States and France regarding Islamophobia that is 
not explained by political rhetoric or the media.
What makes Islamophobia unique among other social justice issues, is that it 
surrounds a religion. Islam is not a phenotypical trait or necessarily made identifiable by
apparel, or any other visible characteristic. It is a religion, and lifestyle, practice by 
people from different cultural backgrounds, with different physical appearances, and 
different levels of religiosity. Though Islamophobia is not the only religious based 
social justice issue it is important to point out why that distinction is important. Because
Islamophobia is religious-based discrimination, the policies surrounding the relationship
between religion and governments are central to the issue. In the United States, a 
country made up of generations of global immigration that protects religious freedom at
the highest levels of governance, there is no clear and central policy regarding the 
regulation of religion and government. The absence of which, has put minority religions
at a dangerous disadvantage that has deprived them of access to the legal protections 
and services that the government is duty-bound to provide. In France, there is a 
strikingly similar problem, in which the lack of a clear, functional, and fair policy 
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regulating the relationship between religion and government has left minority religions 
to at a dangerous legal and social disadvantaged. This absence of government protection
has left Muslims in France without functional legal avenues to regulate issues of 
discrimination, and at socio-economic disadvantages from which they are denied 
opportunities for economic and social growth. In the United States, as well as in France,
the relationship between state and religion is not governed by a specific policy, but is 
understood through interpretations of past judicial decisions. Decisions regarding the 
legality of behaviors involving both religion and government are left to the discretion of
sitting courts. Their decisions are based on the interpretations of both previous courts, 
and their own interpretation of the decisions previously made. This research 
demonstrates the ways in which sitting court justices can significantly re-route the 
interpretation of previous decisions to serve their own agendas, as was done in the 
United States when Justice Rehnquist shifted the legal interpretation of the first 
amendment from his predecessor’s favor of the Establishment Clause interpretation to 
his own favor for the Free Exercise Clause interpretation. This shift in interpretation, 
accomplished by a single sitting supreme court re-routed the legal interpretation of both 
current and future Separation of Church and State related legal decisions in a very 
significant way. Thus, the absence of a central policy regarding the relationship between
the government and religion has created a space for debate and argument, one that has 
left minority religions vulnerable. Despite both American and French attempts to alter 
and amend those decisions to better protect all religions, the majority religion of 
Christianity is still favored over others simply because it is the majority religion. This 
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leaves minority religions, especially Islam that suffers both historic and current political
and social scrutiny, at a disadvantage. 
The successful integration of Islam in Canada under Canadian multicultural 
policy is evidence that a central policy regarding the relationship between government 
and religion is essential for both the legal protection of Muslims and the social 
integration of Muslims. The inclusion of multicultural policy in the Canadian charter 
leaves no room for doubt and dubious legal interpretation regarding religion and 
government because it serves as a clear and central statement that all legal decisions 
will be made in a way that is supportive to cultural difference. This means Islam, as 
well as other minority religions, is protected by the highest legal authority, the Canadian
constitution. Therefore, the religious and cultural practices of Muslims are especially 
protected in Canada. 
Furthermore, the social impact of multiculturalism is just as important as the 
structural and legal protections the policy provides. The presence of multicultural policy
in the Canadian charter sends a powerful message to the general Canadian population 
that multiculturalism is important for Canada and the identity of Canadians. Because 
multiculturalism is thus central to Canadian identity, Canadians are more accepting and 
cooperative with minority religions and cultures and less influenced by stereotypical 
representations of those religions and cultures. This makes Canadians less vulnerable to 
fear based and religiously charged political campaigns, such as the George W. Bush 
administration’s religiously charged wars in the Middle East, the Donald Trump 
administration’s travel ban on Muslim majority countries, and the rise of the anti-
immigration and anti-Muslim political party the National Front in France. 
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Though this research includes only a brief overview of the history of religion in 
the three case studies, it provides evidence that religious heritage is important to the 
culture and society of each nation state, and central to identity. Because religion is so 
significant to identity, policies regarding religion are resistant to change. Though 
significant socio-cultural change will be hard met, it is important to point out that the 
influential power this research has established to be held by political leaders and the 
media does not only function in one direction, but could be beneficial to the diminution 
of Islamophobia just as it has been significant for the rise and spread of Islamophobia. 
As the world continues to globalize, it may be in the best interest of the general 
populations of the United States and France to adopt more multicultural policies, and 
especially to adopt a central policy regarding the relationship between religion and 
government that protects multiculturalism. If this is accomplished there will be less 
confusion regarding the place of Islam, as well as other minority identity groups, within 
the societies of those states. If the cultural and religious practices of Muslims are 
protected in the United States and France as they are in Canada, the comparison of these
three case studies suggests that cultural cooperation may increase, as it has in Canada. 
An increase in cooperation can help unify the general populations of each nation state, 
and facilitate more harmonious interactions among the consistently diversifying 
religious populations of each. The successful integration of minority groups will not 
only serve to strengthen and better harmonize the general population, but could improve
the economies of these states, and create foundations for improved international 
reputations and therefore improved international relations between these states and 
others. The inclusion of a central multicultural policy will not only benefit Muslims, or 
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even religious minorities, but could lay the foundation for the improvement of the legal 
protections and the social integration of other minority identity groups as well, 
including both racial minorities and sexual-orientation minorities. As the world 
continues to globalize, the successful integration of minority groups into general 
societies will become more and more important. The establishment of a central policy 
that protects multiculturalism while regulating the relationships between government 
and religion in a way that treats all religions equally under the law will help to 
harmonize the population, improve the functionality of the courts, and prepare the 
governments and populations of each nation-state for an evident and inevitable increase 
in cultural diversification. 
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